I Am Not Moving

"Hypocrisy has its own elegant symmetry."

After Egypt, Who's Next?

Two weeks ago, I had posted on my Facebook wall a link to Dr. James Hamilton's blog post, Geopolitical Unrest and World Oil Markets. In that post Dr. Hamilton (of the University of California, San Diego) showed that there is a possible inverse relationship between a country's oil production and that country's political instability. Meaning, those countries with low levels of oil production were among the first to revolt, whereas countries with high oil production have shown greater stability. The implication is that the lack of petrodollars had not provided enough of a political safety net for the governments to cover their weak economies.

Hamilton's brief analysis covers (in the order of increasing oil production as a percentage of the world total) Lebanon (0.0%), Tunisia (0.1%), Yemen (0.3%), Sudan (0.6%), Egypt (0.8%), Libya (2.1%), Algeria (2.5%), Iraq (2.7%), Iran (4.9%), and Saudi Arabia (11.7%).

Now, if Hamilton's thesis is correct, then Egypt appears to be the last of the "low-hanging fruit" to have undergone political unrest. Theoretically, then, Libya and/or Algeria should be the next to revolt.

The potential problem with this analysis is that it doesn't explain all of the recent events in the Middle East and North Africa or the lack thereof. For example, Lebanon and Sudan have had long-standing government instability; that they should be undergoing problems now (such as the collapse of the government in Lebanon or the recent referendum in Sudan to split the country into two) are not terribly surprising given these countries' histories.

Likewise, I suspect that some countries that should have gone into turmoil may have had their chance but won't either because their societies are too stable (Morocco? Oman?) or because the state's security apparatus is too strong (Syria?).

What the professor also didn't mention was that Iran, which is second only to Saudi Arabia in oil production, already had its instability in the Green Movement protests of June 2009 that were quashed. I'm not expecting another major uprising in Iran (a la Tahrir Square) anytime soon.

What I think the protests really point out is that standards of living matter. Even more so than a lack of democracy, the economic corruption that pervades certain countries' economies is ultimately the straw that breaks the camel's back, so to speak. I say this with not only the Arab revolts currently going on in mind, but also the dissolution of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe in 1989, which underwent similar revolutions for similar reasons. Republicans in the United States, who seem hell bent on trying to lower American standards of living, should take note of the potential consequences for their actions.

Response to George

Would reducing or eliminating America's dependence on foreign oil undercut the economic basis of Islamophobia?

It might to a degree, but not nearly to the extent that it might have if this was the mid 70s. Although I was only a teenager at the time, the mid 70s seemed to be the main era when Islamophobia was based largely on economics. The trigger event was the oil crisis of '73-'74, which awakened the Western public to both their oil dependence and the fact that Middle Eastern society (in particular) was being built upon petrodollars. This awakening brought about a number of articles that I remember reading which tended to be anti-Arab, anti-Islam. One cartoon I remember from that era showed an Arab sheikh in his thobe and kaffiyah standing on the rim of the Grand Canyon and being told by a man in a business suit behind him that "It's not for sale." (This reminds me of the late 80s, when Japanese businesses began buying up a lot of American businesses and properties, with a resultant backlash against the Japanese at that time; Michael Crichton cashed in on that xenophobia with his book (and movie), Rising Sun.)

But since the mid 70s I'd say that the economic basis for Islamophobia has dwindled fairly dramatically. American Islamophobia today tends to be rooted in a lot of other, non-economic factors (e.g., terrorist acts committed by Muslims, American military misadventures in the Middle East (Lebanon, Iraq) and Central Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan), the Iranian hostage crisis and the dysfunctional diplomatic relationship between the US and Iran ever since, America's blind support for Israel, and the rise of a more visible, more active Muslim community, both in the U.S. and worldwide, that scares American non-Muslims both politically and religiously).

As for foreign oil, as of two years ago (June 2008, when I last wrote about this), five of the top ten countries the U.S. imported oil from were non-Muslim: Canada (who was the #1 seller of crude oil to the US at the time), Mexico, Venezuela, Angola and Ecuador). The first three of those countries provided over 44% of all the U.S.'s imported crude oil. So the U.S. is not quite as dependent upon oil from Muslim countries as perhaps they were in the past.

Personally, I don't think that, even if the U.S. didn't buy a single drop of crude oil from a Muslim country, that would stop all the Islamophobia in the U.S. Many Americans simply can't live without having someone else to hate. Some Muslims haven't helped the American (and worldwide) Muslim community with their actions, but Muslims aren't the only group currently being vilified in the U.S. at the moment. The Hispanics can attest to that.

International Politics Links (29 June 2009)

Once again, sorry for the lack of Links posts last week. I was busy with other matters. This post covers June 22nd through today, June 29th. Not surprisingly, most of the links deal with the Iranian election aftermath; stories on Israel are also increasing, mostly due to renewed settlement in the West Bank. And the newest, hottest story is of the coup in Honduras.)

Americas:
Coup In Honduras

20 People Killed in Peru in Demonstrations


Europe:
Merkel Stands Besides Demonstrators - "in Iran" (In Germany, not so much.)

Russia Ready for Deep Nuclear Arms Cuts: Medvedev


Middle East:
Odierno: Iraqis Ready for Handover

Violence Erupts in Baghdad as Deadline for U.S. Troops to Withdraw From Major Cities Nears

Iraq After The U.S. Retreat

FBI Files: Saddam Hussein Faked Having WMDs (Old news, but worth linking to.)

Karim Sadjadpour Reminds Chris Wallace That U.S. Meddling in Middle East Politics is Not Productive

David Gregory Badgers Benjamin Netanyahu Over Whether Israel Will Take Unilateral Action Against Iran

Resisting Calls, Israel Insists on Building in the West Bank

Israel Deploys Troops Along Lebanese Border (Near Shebaa Farms, specifically.)

Barak Authorizes Construction of 300 New Homes in West Bank (American reaction? Nothing.)

Pakistan Navy Slated for Major Revamp


Iran:
Has There Been a Military Coup in Iran by the Revolutionary Guard in Iran?

Reza Aslan on Iran (His interview on The Daily Show.)

Neda: A Civil Rights Struggle

Obama: Neda Video 'Heartbreaking'

The Meaning of Neda

In Iran, Authorities Admit Voting Discrepancies

Rachel Maddow: Iranian Protesters Targetting the Basiji

Evidence Of Western Intelligence Meddling in Iran

Sunday's Protest March Broken Up; Rafsanjani Defers to Khamenei (Sunday referring to June 28th.)

5,000 March Silently in Iran

Washington and the Iran Protests: Would they be Allowed in the US?

Guardianship Council Rules out Annulment of Election Results; Reformists Planning Strikes, Mourning

Chatham House Study Definitively Shows Massive Ballot Fraud in Iran's Reported Results

More Details on Saturday's Demonstrations (This would have been Saturday, June 20th.)

An Interesting Detail

Iran Election Wrap Up

Has the U.S. Played a Role in Fomenting Unrest During Iran’s Election?

Iran: 'There is Very Little Logic at Work' (This was a very interesting personal essay. Must read.)

Obama Questions Legitimacy of Iranian Elections, Says It is ‘Up to the Iranian People to Decide’ Their Leadership.

Lugar: The U.S. Should Still Be Willing To ‘Sit Down’ With Iran For Nuclear Talks


Asia:
China Crosses the Rubicon

China-India Relations: An Unresolved Border and 60,000 Troops Deployed

Thousands of Anti-Govt Protesters Mass in Bangkok (Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra wants to come home.)


Miscellaneous:
Senegal: Islam, Democracy, Sexy

Indefinite Detention, Anyone? White House is Drafting New Executive Order

Obama Considering an Executive Order Allowing Indefinite Detention.

2008 Oil Reserves Analysis

The Economist had a recent graph showing oil reserves as of the end of 2008, with the number of years remaining for each country's reserves at the 2008 rate of production. I posted a similar graph from The Economist back in June 2006, so we'll do a little analysis to see how things have gone in the past three years.

First, there have been some changes in the rankings for total reserves. The top four (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Kuwait) remain the same, but Venezuela has moved up one notch, replacing the UAE in fifth place. Russia remains at #7, but Libya has moved up to #8, replacing Kazakhstan. Numbers 10 (Nigeria), 11 (United States) and 12 (Canada) remain the same, but Qatar has moved ahead of China for 13th place. Angola comes in at #15 in the 2008 chart, up four places. Eight countries that were on the 2005 chart were omitted this time (in alphabetical order): Algeria, Azerbaijan, Brazil, India, Mexico, Norway, Oman, and Sudan).

The 2005 chart mentioned that if production were to continue at 2005's level of production, the world would have 41 years' worth of oil left. The good news is that, three years on, global supplies should actually last for another 42 years.

Doing a quick-and-dirty analysis, we can find out which countries have been winners over the past three years and which were losers. Winners are those countries whose reserves will survive longer today than they were expected to last in 2005's estimate, taking into account the three years of production that have passed. (This could happen either because more oil reserves have been proved in the past three years, because production slowed down, or both.)

In fact, all of the countries were winners, except for three; the winners being: Saudi Arabia (3.5 years), Iraq (3), Kuwait (2.6), Venezuela (30!), Russia (3.8), Libya (4.6), Nigeria (10.6), United States (3.4), Canada (12.1), Qatar (19.1), China (2.1), and Angola (2.7).

The three losers were Iran (-3.1), the UAE (-4.3), and Kazakhstan (-7.0).

The full Economist article:

Although the price of oil peaked at $147 a barrel in 2008, the world’s proven oil reserves—those that are known and recoverable with existing technology—fell only slightly, to 1,258 billion barrels, according to BP, a British oil company. That is 18% higher than in 1998. OPEC tightened its grip slightly in 2008, and commands slightly more than three-quarters of proven reserves. Saudi Arabia and Iran together account for almost one-third of the total. Venezuela, with nearly 8%, has the largest share of any non-Middle Eastern country. BP reckons that if the world continues to produce oil at the same rate as last year, global supplies will last another 42 years, even if no more oil reserves are found.

Jon Lee Anderson: Understanding The Basij

I don't follow Iranian culture and politics that closely, so the information in Jon Lee Anderson's essay at The New Yorker on Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Basij is new to me. In the past few days, stories like this (Warning: not for the squeamish!) suggest that the Basij are thugs who are not afraid to get their hands dirty on behalf of their political patrons (and Anderson's essay says as much as well). But there is, apparently, another side to the Basij and Ahmadinejad. Two excerpts:

On a trip I made to Iran in 2006, a year after Ahmadinejad assumed the presidency, I met a Basij official, Dr. Mahdi Araby, who worked at the Tehran City Hall. In the late nineteen-nineties, Araby had been one of Ahmadinejad’s engineering students at the Iran University of Science and Technology, where Ahmadinejad was studying for his Ph.D. in traffic management. In 2003, after Ahmadinejad’s appointment as mayor of Tehran, he had asked Araby to come and work with him. Araby described Mayor Ahmadinejad as a man of pure heart and missionary zeal. “His original aim was not political,” explained Araby. “He just wanted to serve people.”

Araby pointed to a beige windbreaker that was hanging on a hook on the closed door of the room. I remarked that it appeared to be exactly like the jacket the president usually wore. He smiled proudly and said it was his. “It is the jacket of the Basij.” he said.

He then told me the following story. One night during Ahmadinejad’s time as mayor, Araby had been driving home when he saw an elderly couple standing by the side of the road and looking as though they were in distress. They were holding up a jerrican to show that they had run out of gas, but no one had stopped to assist them. Araby did. He instructed the old man how to siphon some petrol from his car, but the man had explained that he was asthmatic, so Araby did it himself. The old woman had wanted to pay him, but he had refused, telling them, “I am a Basiji. It is our duty to help.” Araby accidentally swallowed some of the petrol and had begun spitting up blood, so he ended up in hospital for three weeks. He explained that he had a lung problem from a chemical-weapon attack during the Iran-Iraq war. He smiled; his wounds, like his Basij jacket, were a badge of honor.

Next, Araby told me a story he had heard about Ahmadinejad while he was mayor. The story was that Ahmadinejad had been dressing up as a streetsweeper at night and going out with a work crew for an entire month, to understand what their life was like and decide how to pay them a fair wage. Araby had confronted Ahmadinejad about the story and asked if it was true. “He asked where I had heard it from, and he smiled,” said Araby. To him, Ahmadinejad’s reaction was a confirmation of the rumor. “Ahmadinejad is a true Basiji,” he said approvingly.

It was that same spirit that propelled Ahmadinejad into the presidential race, Araby believed. “I can tell you that, up to two months before the presidential election in 2005, he was undecided about running. But our people were fed up with the promises being made during the presidential campaign, and we realized that the middle-class people, and the people at the lower rungs of society, were not satisfied either.” Araby said, “He hadn’t planned to become president. We pushed him to do it.”

...

Gharavian, a teacher of Islamic studies, wore black and white robes and a black turban. He explained that it was he who had first brought Ahmadinejad to Yazdi’s attention, and that it had come about by a quirk of destiny. The ayatollah had been in the habit of speaking to the university professors’ Basij organization once a week, but once, when he was unable to attend, and Gharavian had stood in for him. He had met and been impressed by Ahmadinejad, who was a prominent member of the group. Afterward, he told Ayatollah Yazdi about him, and introduced them. “What was it that impressed you?” I asked Gharavian. “I saw that he had a true Basij culture,” he said approvingly. “And that, like Imam Khomeini, he was especially resistant to foreign cultural influences.”

James Petras: The Iranian ‘Stolen Elections’ Hoax

The more I read about the Iranian election, the more I agree with the counter-analysis that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did, in fact, win the recent Iranian election fairly. Most of the American press (and especially bloggers) seems to be driven largely by wishful thinking, that Ahmadinejad, being the American bogey man that he's become, needed to be booted out of office, with the accusation of electoral fraud being a sufficient-enough reason to think Hossein Mousavi should have won.

Of the voices on the American political left that I've read, only Juan Cole at Informed Comment seemed to provide a reasoned explanation for why Ahmadinejad "stole" the election. However, James Petras, in this essay at GlobalResearch.ca, discusses why Cole's argument regarding ethnic and linguistic identity is not a sound indicator of voting behavior.

What many on the left fail to grasp is that so-called reform movements like Mousavi's are made up mostly of the urban elites, people like themselves. However, the more conservative voters, like in America, tend to come from rural areas. Petras brings up several examples of elections that went strongly in favor of populist/nationalist politicians (Juan Peron of Argentina, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Lula da Silva of Brazil); to which I would add Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand, whose Thai Rak Thai party ("Thai Loves Thai") was also mostly supported by the rural poor in the 2001 and 2005 general elections.

I think a lot of people on the left underestimate the electoral power of the rural poor, especially in countries that are still developing economically. While the needs and aspirations of the urban elite may be similar from country to country, even in nations as dissimilar as Iran and the US, the needs and aspirations of the rural poor are much stronger and more acute in countries like Thailand and Iran than in the prosperous US, where the red states can afford financially to vote against their economic interests in favor of social values.

I've written an additional comment below the following excerpts:

There is hardly any election, in which the White House has a significant stake, where the electoral defeat of the pro-US candidate is not denounced as illegitimate by the entire political and mass media elite. In the most recent period, the White House and its camp followers cried foul following the free (and monitored) elections in Venezuela and Gaza, while joyously fabricating an ‘electoral success’ in Lebanon despite the fact that the Hezbollah-led coalition received over 53% of the vote.

The recently concluded, June 12, 2009 elections in Iran are a classic case: The incumbent nationalist-populist President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (MA) received 63.3% of the vote (or 24.5 million votes), while the leading Western-backed liberal opposition candidate Hossein Mousavi (HM) received 34.2% or (13.2 million votes).

Iran’s presidential election drew a record turnout of more than 80% of the electorate, including an unprecedented overseas vote of 234,812, in which HM won 111,792 to MA’s 78,300. The opposition led by HM did not accept their defeat and organized a series of mass demonstrations that turned violent, resulting in the burning and destruction of automobiles, banks, public buildings and armed confrontations with the police and other authorities.

...

A number of newspaper pundits, including Gideon Rachman of the Financial Times, claim as evidence of electoral fraud the fact that Ahmadinejad won 63% of the vote in an Azeri-speaking province against his opponent, Mousavi, an ethnic Azeri. The simplistic assumption is that ethnic identity or belonging to a linguistic group is the only possible explanation of voting behavior rather than other social or class interests.

A closer look at the voting pattern in the East-Azerbaijan region of Iran reveals that Mousavi won only in the city of Shabestar among the upper and the middle classes (and only by a small margin), whereas he was soundly defeated in the larger rural areas, where the re-distributive policies of the Ahmadinejad government had helped the ethnic Azeris write off debt, obtain cheap credits and easy loans for the farmers. Mousavi did win in the West-Azerbaijan region, using his ethnic ties to win over the urban voters. In the highly populated Tehran province, Mousavi beat Ahmadinejad in the urban centers of Tehran and Shemiranat by gaining the vote of the middle and upper class districts, whereas he lost badly in the adjoining working class suburbs, small towns and rural areas.

The careless and distorted emphasis on ‘ethnic voting’ cited by writers from the Financial Times and New York Times to justify calling Ahmadinejad ‘s victory a ‘stolen vote’ is matched by the media’s willful and deliberate refusal to acknowledge a rigorous nationwide public opinion poll conducted by two US experts just three weeks before the vote, which showed Ahmadinejad leading by a more than 2 to 1 margin – even larger than his electoral victory on June 12. This poll revealed that among ethnic Azeris, Ahmadinejad was favored by a 2 to 1 margin over Mousavi, demonstrating how class interests represented by one candidate can overcome the ethnic identity of the other candidate (Washington Post June 15, 2009). The poll also demonstrated how class issues, within age groups, were more influential in shaping political preferences than ‘generational life style’. According to this poll, over two-thirds of Iranian youth were too poor to have access to a computer and the 18-24 year olds “comprised the strongest voting bloc for Ahmadinejad of all groups” (Washington Post June 15, 2009).

The only group, which consistently favored Mousavi, was the university students and graduates, business owners and the upper middle class. The ‘youth vote’, which the Western media praised as ‘pro-reformist’, was a clear minority of less than 30% but came from a highly privileged, vocal and largely English speaking group with a monopoly on the Western media. Their overwhelming presence in the Western news reports created what has been referred to as the ‘North Tehran Syndrome’, for the comfortable upper class enclave from which many of these students come. While they may be articulate, well dressed and fluent in English, they were soundly out-voted in the secrecy of the ballot box.

In general, Ahmadinejad did very well in the oil and chemical producing provinces. This may have be a reflection of the oil workers’ opposition to the ‘reformist’ program, which included proposals to ‘privatize’ public enterprises. Likewise, the incumbent did very well along the border provinces because of his emphasis on strengthening national security from US and Israeli threats in light of an escalation of US-sponsored cross-border terrorist attacks from Pakistan and Israeli-backed incursions from Iraqi Kurdistan, which have killed scores of Iranian citizens. Sponsorship and massive funding of the groups behind these attacks is an official policy of the US from the Bush Administration, which has not been repudiated by President Obama; in fact it has escalated in the lead-up to the elections.

What Western commentators and their Iranian protégés have ignored is the powerful impact which the devastating US wars and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan had on Iranian public opinion: Ahmadinejad’s strong position on defense matters contrasted with the pro-Western and weak defense posture of many of the campaign propagandists of the opposition.

The great majority of voters for the incumbent probably felt that national security interests, the integrity of the country and the social welfare system, with all of its faults and excesses, could be better defended and improved with Ahmadinejad than with upper-class technocrats supported by Western-oriented privileged youth who prize individual life styles over community values and solidarity.

...

Amhadinejad’s electoral success, seen in historical comparative perspective should not be a surprise. In similar electoral contests between nationalist-populists against pro-Western liberals, the populists have won. Past examples include Peron in Argentina and, most recently, Chavez of Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia and even Lula da Silva in Brazil, all of whom have demonstrated an ability to secure close to or even greater than 60% of the vote in free elections. The voting majorities in these countries prefer social welfare over unrestrained markets, national security over alignments with military empires.

...

The wild card in the aftermath of the elections is the Israeli response: Netanyahu has signaled to his American Zionist followers that they should use the hoax of ‘electoral fraud’ to exert maximum pressure on the Obama regime to end all plans to meet with the newly re-elected Ahmadinejad regime.

Paradoxically, US commentators (left, right and center) who bought into the electoral fraud hoax are inadvertently providing Netanyahu and his American followers with the arguments and fabrications: Where they see religious wars, we see class wars; where they see electoral fraud, we see imperial destabilization.

I also wanted to say that President Obama has done the right thing by not getting involved as the Iranians settle their electoral results. The Republicans, such as John McCain, who have tried to goad Obama into interfering with Iranian politics, have shown a tremendous amount of arrogance and hypocrisy on their part. If another country were to interfere with the American electoral process, they would be rightly indignant. Why they think they can interfere with another country's election is beyond me. Shut up, John!

International Politics Links (15 June 2009)

Almost all of the significant stories this past week in international politics focused on the Iranian election. Juan Cole wrote a number of blog posts throughout the week about that election, with the more recent posts up top. Moon of Alabama doesn't buy Dr. Cole's ideas about the election results. I hate to use this particular slogan, but "We report, you decide," seems to be appropriate in this instance. ;) There are a couple of other stories on Afghanistan, the recent Lebanon election, and North Korea.


Middle East:
Afghanistan: Northern Supply Lines Under Attack (Moon of Alabama)

Former GITMO Detainee Speaks Out! YES! I WAS TORTURED! (Crooks & Liars)

Biden: 'Real doubt' about Iran's presidential election (Crooks & Liars)

TYT: Neocons Rooting For Ahmadinejad To Win (Crooks & Liars)

Reza Aslan Takes Chris Matthews to Task for Fear Mongering on Iran's Nuclear Program (Crooks & Liars)

Clashes, Claims of Election Fraud in Iran (Informed Comment)

Terror Free Tomorrow Poll Did not Predict Ahmadinejad Win (Informed Comment)

Post-Election Demonstrations, Violence, Arrests (Informed Comment)

Class v. Culture Wars in Iranian Elections: Rejecting Charges of a North Tehran Fallacy (Informed Comment)

Stealing the Iranian Election (Informed Comment)

Rafsanjani Blasts Ahmadinejad as a Counter-Revolutionary ; Charismatic Rahnevard Attracts Crowds for her Husband Mousavi (Informed Comment)

Ahmadinejad Defends Himself on Iranian Television (Informed Comment)

Tens of Thousands Rally for Mousavi in Tehran (Informed Comment)

Some Dots You May Want To Connect (Moon of Alabama)

More on the Iran Election (Moon of Alabama)

March 14 Faction Wins in Lebanon (Informed Comment)


Asia:
North Korea: We Will Weaponize Nuclear Stockpiles (Crooks & Liars)

As Tensions Between North Korea and U.S. Rise, Clinton Hints At Weapons Interdiction (Crooks & Liars)


Other:
Joe Scarborough Blames Obama's Cairo Speech for Ayatollahs Rigging Iranian Election--But That's a Good Thing ("Joe Scarborough seems to think the ayotollahs [sic] rigged the election because Obama's Cairo speech scared them into over reaching and making sure he didn't get credit for the reformers winning in Iran, but if they did, it's a good thing in the long run for the United States. ... If they rigged the election Joe, it's likely for the same reasons the Republicans have rigged elections in the United States...to stay in power. Not because they're worried about American politics.") (Crooks & Liars)

Links for 26 May 2009

Politics:
Mapping the Fallen (Someone has done a mash-up of all the American and coalition soldiers who have died in Iraq and Afghanistan and marked both their hometowns and the place in which they died on Google Earth.)

Terror Plotter's Sick Brother: 'He Did It For Me' ("What's worse: A healthcare system where someone is so desperate, he'd blow up buildings to pay for his brother's treatment [the brother apparently has a bad liver], or an FBI that thinks nothing of setting people up so they can claim they caught some 'terrorists'?")

Andrew Breitbart says Oprah is secretly running the Obama White House (This guy is a real loon!)

The North Korean Nuclear Test

Israel's Plans For Launching A War On Iran

Obama Announces SCOTUS Pick: Sonia Sotomayor. Now Let The Games Begin! (See also Judge Sotomayor, Right-Wing Interest Groups Driven By Financial Motives In Attacking Obama’s Court Pick, and Obama To Name Sonia Sotomayor As His Supreme Court Nominee.)


Economics:
As Unemployment Claims Run Out, Many Workers Are Opting for Early Retirement


Business:
Cut your ad budget at your own risk (The advice here is frequently taught in business school and is really a no-brainer, but you'd be surprised how often managers do just the opposite. The results of the study are interesting: "Almost half of Americans believe that lack of advertising by a retail store, bank or auto dealership during a recession means the business must be struggling.")


Islam/Muslim Blogs:
Upcoming Productions (Bin Gregory announces his future seventh, insha'allah, and writes a wonderful bit of snark about the "Muslim Plot to Take Over the World™.")

Lesson of the Death of 1st Lt. Roslyn Schulte

A school 'condemned to death' ("Why are the authorities refusing to fund France's oldest Muslim school, now facing bankruptcy?")


Miscellaneous:
Hubble Floats Free

Oslo Grand Prix: Horserse (I missed this one a couple days ago, but it's too good not to link to. Ever see a six-legged horse before? ;) )

The Independent: Secret War Report Led to Spy Charges for Roxana Saberi

One of the potential pitfalls for those of us bloggers who cover news stories is that of the knee-jerk reaction. It is all too easy to react quickly to a story without having read or heard all of the information. The recent case of Roxana Sabieri, the Iranian-American journalist who was recently sentenced in Iran to eight years for spying, is very typical of the knee-jerk reaction. Of course, there were several other factors that made Ms. Roxana a cause celebré. The fact that Ms. Roxana is pretty certainly didn't hurt her. (If you think I'm being sexist, don't forget the numerous other cases of attractive women and girls the media and bloggers have fawned over.) Add to the fact that Ms. Roxana's arrest and trial made for a story similar to the typical "damsel in distress" fairy-tale or Lifetime channel "women in jeapordy" movie, with the "villain" in this case being Iran (and a Muslim country to boot). It's no surprise that the public went gaga over her story.

Which made the linked article over at The Independent (UK) all the more interesting for having provided some of the missing details. For example, the charge of spying was not simply a trumped up charge, but had some basis in fact:

A joyful Roxana Saberi yesterday thanked those who helped win her release as her lawyer revealed his client had been convicted of spying in part because she had a copy of a confidential Iranian report on the war in Iraq.

Ms Saberi, a freelance journalist who was freed on Monday after four months in prison in Tehran, had copied the report "out of curiosity" while she worked as a freelance translator for a powerful body connected to Iran's ruling clerics, said the lawyer, Saleh Nikbakht.

It turned into a key part of the prosecution's case against Ms Saberi during her secret, closed-door trial in mid-April before an Iranian security court, Mr Nikbakht said. Prosecutors had also cited a trip to Israel that Ms Saberi had made in 2006, he said. Iran bars its citizens from visiting Israel, its regional nemesis. (Emphasis mine.)

Now certainly the Iranian government didn't help their image in their rush to judgment:

Ms Saberi's original trial was a swift, single session that her father said had lasted only 15 minutes. She didn't have a chance to speak and she was sentenced to eight years in prison, drawing an outcry from Washington.

But she spoke in an appeals court on Sunday, explaining her side to the judges, Mr Nikbakht said.

Still, she had done wrong, as she admitted to the court:

Ms Saberi had admitted that she had copied the document two years ago but said she had not passed it on to the Americans as prosecutors had claimed. She had apologised, saying it had been a mistake to take the report.

At the time, Ms Saberi was doing occasional translations for the website of the Expediency Council, which is made up of clerics who mediate between the legislature, the presidency and Iran's clerical leadership over constitutional disputes. Mr Nikbakht gave no details on what was in the document because it remains confidential.

Ms Saberi also told the appeals court that she had engaged in no activities against Iran during her visit to Israel, Mr Nikbakht said.

The court accepted her explanation and reduced her sentence to a suspended two-year term, prompting her release.

And to make matters worse for Westerners who despise Iran and its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the latter comes out of the story looking like one of the good guys:

Another of Ms Saberi's lawyers, Abdolsamad Khorramshahi, said a letter from the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to the court, urging it to give Ms Saberi's case a complete review, had helped bring about the sentence reduction.

Update: Moon of Alabama comes to similar conclusions:

Iran had good reason and acted within its laws in arresting and sentencing Roxana Saberi. The 'western' media used the case for the usual Iran bashing. Ironically this publicity gave Iran the opening for offering a deal.

The speed of the appeal sentence and the probation are unusual. The personal intervention of Ahmedinejad and the presence of Vali Reza Nasr in Tehran point to a government deal. For immediately setting free Saberi, Iran will get some U.S. concession.

Within a few days we are likely to see some reporting in Iranian media that the three diplomats arrested in Arbil two years ago have been set free.

A small step on the larger path of U.S. Iranian détente.

Links for 11 May 2009

Happy Vesak Day!

Politics:
Pakistani president believes Osama bin Laden is dead (Pakistan President Asif Ali Zadari believes Osama bin Laden is dead. "I don't think he's alive," Zadari told NBC's David Gregory. "I have a strong feeling and reason to believe that.")

The Faulty Logic of Tea Baggers (More proof that wingnuts have no intelligence.)

Coulter brings up a tender subject for Hannity: Fox anchors getting waterboarded (While I have no love for Ann Coulter, her twisting the knife in Faux News' Sean Hannity over his cowardice to submit to waterboarding - which he volunteered to do for charity - is a delicious irony.)

The Problem is Statelessness (Juan Cole: "In my view, the central problems in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the statelessness of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and in their diaspora, the continued military occupation or blockade by the Israelis, and the rapid expansion of Israeli colonies, which are usurping Palestinian land and rights. ... Until the statelessness of the Palestinians is understood and seen as the central problem that it is, there can be no real progress on the issues.")

Generation Charlie X ("I think people who who spend their time worrying about other people comparing Obama to Spock and then use that as a launching pad to lament failing American/Israeli relations maybe need to spend less time with computers, fanboy movies, and The New Republic and a little more time exploring strange new worlds. You know, like girls; the final frontier.")

Iran Releases Journalist Convicted of Spying for U.S.


Economics:
More on Employment (Bonddad: "What I do see is the possibility of another "jobless" recovery on the horizon." Me: Unfortunately, that is an all-too-true possibility.)


Islam/Muslim Blogs:
Prisoners in Ranby jail make bomb to blow up Muslims ("A bomb made by jail inmates to blow up Muslim prisoners came within moments of exploding outside a prayer meeting. The device, made with fireworks and detonators smuggled in with a fishing rod, was put in a room where worshipers wash their hands and feet for Friday prayers. ... But a prison officer spotted it, picked it up and carried it into the middle of the playing field. A bomb disposal unit called to Ranby Prison in Retford, Notts, confirmed the bomb was a viable device primed to go off.")


Miscellaneous:
Top 25 Star Trek Characters

Petroleum and Natural Gas Proved Reserves, 2009, Top 10

This is an annual post; the data is only updated annually. For the 2008 data, please click here.

The Energy Information Administration, a department of the U.S. Department of Energy, has recently released the January 1, 2009 proved reserves for petroleum and natural gas. Proved reserves are the amount of oil and gas in the ground that is "reasonably certain" to be extracted using current technology at current prices. The following are lists of the top ten countries for petroleum and natural gas proved reserves, with their quantities and percentage of the world total for 2009:

Petroleum - Billion Barrels
1. Saudi Arabia - 266.710 (19.87%)
2. Canada - 178.092 (13.27%)
3. Iran - 136.150 (10.14%)
4. Iraq - 115.000 (8.57%)
5. Kuwait - 104.000 (7.75%)
6. Venezuela - 99.377 (7.40%)
7. United Arab Emirates - 97.800 (7.29%)
8. Russian Federation - 60.000 (4.47%)
9. Libya - 43.660 (3.25%)
10. Nigeria - 36.220 (2.70%)

Notes:

• The world total of proved reserves is 1,342.207 billion barrels of petroleum, an increase of 10.164 billion barrels over 2008's total (a 0.76% increase).
  
• The total of the top ten countries makes up 84.71% of the world's proved reserves.
  
• Venezuela was the only country to move up in the rankings, having placed seventh in 2008; the United Arab Emirates dropped one place, to seventh.
  
• Canada's proved reserves are estimated to be 5.4 billion barrels of conventional crude oil and 173.2 billion barrels of oil sands reserves. (Oil sands are much more costly to refine than conventional crude oil.)
  
• Two countries had singificant increases in their amounts of crude oil proved reserves in 2008: Venezuela, with an increase of 12.342 billion barrels, and Libya, with an increase of 2.196 billion barrels. Ten other countries also had increases in their proved reserves as well; however, the highest amount of any of the ten was 442 million barrels (Brazil).
  
• Two countries had significant depletions in their amounts of crude oil proved reserves in 2008: Iran, with a decrease of 2.250 billion barrels, and Mexico, with a decrease of 1.149 billion barrels. Thirteen other countries also had decreases in their proved reserves.

Natural Gas - Trillion Cubic Feet
1. Russian Federation - 1,680.000 (26.86%)
2. Iran - 991.600 (15.85%)
3. Qatar - 891.945 (14.26%)
4. Saudi Arabia - 258.470 (4.13%)
5. United States - 237.726 (3.80%)
6. United Arab Emirates - 214.400 (3.43%)
7. Nigeria - 184.160 (2.94%)
8. Venezuela - 170.920 (2.73%)
9. Algeria - 159.000 (2.54%)
10. Iraq - 111.940 (1.79%)

Notes:

• The world total of proved reserves is 6,254.364 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, an increase of 42.029 trillion cubic feet (a 0.68% increase). (I've noted a discrepancy in the difference between 2008 and 2009, coming up with an increase of 41.714 trillion cubic feet, a difference of 0.315 trillion cubic feet.)
  
• The total of the top ten countries makes up 78.35% of the world's proved reserves.
  
• There were no changes in the top ten rankings.
  
• Twelve countries had increases in their total proved reserves in 2008, for a total of 83.968 trillion cubic feet; however, this was partially offset by decreases in a total of fourteen countries, with depletions of 42.254 trillion cubic feet.

The Meeting between Umar and Hurmuzān

Another story from Hugh Kennedy's book, The Great Arab Conquests (pp. 130-31). As the Arab army swept through Khūzestān (in what is now southwestern Iran), the Persian general Hurmuzān (Hormozan) fled to the city of Tustar (now Shushtar), where he and his forces were besieged by the army of Abu Musa Al-Ash'ari for at least eighteen months (some records say two years). Shustar finally fell when one or two of the city residents befriended the Arab soldiers and agreed to help them in exchange for a third of the spoils. The Arabs then tunneled under the city walls, and the city was eventually taken. However, the decision was made to send Hurmuzān to the Caliph Umar, who would decide his fate:

After his surrender at Tustar, he was brought to Medina to be presented to the caliph. Before he and his escort entered the city, they arrayed him in all his finery, his brocade and cloth-of-gold robes and a crown studded with rubies. Then they led him through the streets so that everyone could see him. When they reached Umar's house, however, they found that he was not there, so they went to look for him in the mosque but could not find him there either. Finally they passed a group of boys playing in the street, who told them that the caliph was asleep in a corner of the mosque with his cloak folded under his head for a pillow.

When they returned to the mosque they found him as the boys had said. He had just received a delegation of visitors from Kūfa and, when they had left, he had simply put his head down for a nap. Apart from him there was no one in the mosque. They sat down a little way from him. Hurmuzān enquired where his guards and attendants were but was told he had none. "Then he must be a prophet," the Persian said. "No," his escort replied, "but he does the things prophets do." Meanwhile more people gathered round and the noise woke Umar up. He sat up and saw the Persian and the escort asked him to talk to the "king of Ahvaz." Umar refused as long as he was wearing all his finery, and only when the prisoner had been stripped as far as decency allowed and reclad in a coarse robe did the interrogation begin.

Umar asked Hurmuzān what he thought about the recent turn of events, to which the Persian replied that in the old days God was not on the side of the Persians or the Arabs and the Persians were in the ascendancy, but now God was favoring the Arabs and they had won. Umar replied that the real reason was that the Persians had previously been united while the Arabs had not. Umar was inclined to execute him in revenge for the Muslims he had slain. Hurmuzān asked for some water, and when it was given to him he said he was afraid he would be killed while he was drinking. The caliph replied that he would not be killed before he had drunk the water, whereupon Hurmuzān allowed his hands to tremble and the water was spilled. When Umar again threatened to kill him, the Persian said that he had already been given immunity; after all, he had not drunk the water. Umar was furious, but the assembled company agreed that Hurmuzān was right. In the end, he was converted to Islam, allowed to live in Medina and given a substantial pension.

Kennedy continues:

The story of Hurmuzān's trick is probably a folk motif grafted on to historical events, but it serves its purpose to illustrate the contrast between Persian pride and luxury and Muslim simplicity; the honesty of the Muslims and the integration of elements of the Persian elite into the Muslim hierarchy.

In E.J. Brill's First Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1913-1936, al-Hurzumān, described as the King of Susiana,

"...succeeded as saving his life by his cunning but only on condition that he adopted Islām. He was able to be useful to the Caliph in various ways on account of his knowledge of Persian affairs. But when 'Omar was murdered in 23 = 644 by a Persian Christian, al-Hurmuzān, probably without reason, was suspected of being an accomplice and killed by 'Ubaid Allāh, son of the Caliph." (p. 338)

Photo credit: Panoramio/shushtari

The Conquest of Junday-Shapur

Another story from Hugh Kennedy's book, The Great Arab Conquests (p. 128), this time dealing with the "conquest" of Junday-Shapur (also known as Jondisapur (p. 206) or Gundishapur), an ancient city that lies in the modern Iranian province of Khūzestān, between the cities of Dezful and Shustar.

According to this story, the city resisted vigorously until one day, to the great surprise of the Muslims, the gates were flung open and the city was opened up. The Muslims asked the defenders what had come over them, to which they replied, "You have shot us an arrow with a message that safety would be granted to us. We have accepted this and set aside the tribute payments." The Muslims replied that they had done no such thing, but after extensive enquiries they found a slave, originally from Junday-shapur, who admitted that he had indeed written such a message. The Muslim commanders explained that this was the work of a slave with no authority to make such an offer, to which the inhabitants replied that they had no means of knowing that and finished by saying that they were going to keep their side of the bargain, even if the Muslims chose to act treacherously. The Muslims referred the matter to [the Caliph] Umar, who responded that the promise was in fact binding, for "God holds the keeping of promises in the highest esteem." The moral is clear: even the promise of a slave must be respected.

Photo credit: Wikipedia/Zereshk - The interior of Masjid Jameh (Congregational Mosque) in Dezful, Iran.

Maz Jobrani on the Media's Coverage of Middle Easterners

It's been a long time since I last put on a Maz Jobrani video here, but I just came across this one and Maz is spot on.

Update: How Much Oil Does America Import?

Currently, my most popular blog post by far is How Much Oil Does America Import?, written back in May 2006, two years ago. I thought it was time to update the figures and see how the U.S. is doing since I first wrote that post.

The U.S. gets its oil from two sources: either it pumps its own oil, called "Field Production" by the Department of Energy, or it imports oil from other countries around the world. In 2000, American commercial field production made up 38.69% of the total supply of crude oil, while imports made up 60.28%. In 2005, when I wrote the last post, those same percentages were 33.67% and 65.84%, respectively. (These numbers are different from what I wrote back in 2006 as adjustments have been made to the official statistics; these types of revisions are normal for economic statistics.) In 2007 (the most recent year), the percentages were 33.72% and 66.19%, respectively. While there has been an extremely slight increase in the amount of oil pumped domestically (0.05%), imports have also increased as well. (The reason why both numbers can increase is because a third number, "supply adjustments," fell.)

In 2007, the U.S. imported a total of 3,656,170 thousand barrels. Of those 3.66 billion barrles, the U.S. imported from a total of 46 different countries. The top 5 importing countries were: Canada (18.61%), Saudi Arabia (14.50%), Mexico (14.07%), Venezuela (11.48%), and Nigeria (10.80%), for a total of 69.47% of all American imports. In contrast, imports from countries six through ten (Angola, Iraq, Algeria, Ecuador, and Kuwait) made up only 17.95% of the total; countries 11 through 46 made up the remaining 12.58%.

Looking at petroleum imports in two other ways...

In 2007, imports from OPEC countries* made up 53.85% of all U.S. imports, compared to the 46.15% from non-OPEC countries. However, this is the exception rather than the rule. Since 1993, when the Energy Information Agency (EIA) started breaking out the statistics, non-OPEC countries have been the dominant exporters ten years out of the past fifteen. The year 2007 was the first time since 2001 that OPEC countries had sold more petroleum to the U.S. than non-OPEC countries.

With respect to the Persian Gulf, those countries** only made up 21.19% of the total imports. This is down slightly, one-half percent, from my 2006 analysis. Note that the U.S. imports no oil from Iran.

Conclusions/Predictions:
Two years ago, I made four points as to how I thought things would go with respect to American oil imports and consumption. We'll look at how good or bad those predictions were:

1. American field production will probably go below 25% of its total annual supply within the next five years.

I think we can write this prediction off; I don't foresee this happening within the next three years (or perhaps even the next ten).

2. In that same time frame, imports will probably be in the high 50s percentage (perhaps 58-59%).

On the other hand, I think this prediction is very much a lock at this time. In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if this number goes back up again, remaining in the 60-65% range.

3. America will continue to seek the majority of its oil from non-OPEC countries, such as Canada and Mexico, if only to avoid being as dependent on OPEC countries as they have been in the past. However, this will probably turn out to be a pipe dream in the long run unless Canadian oil reserve estimates turn out to be near the high end. (Estimates for Canada's proven oil reserves ranges from 4.7 billion barrels (World Oil) to 14.803 billion barrels (BP Statistical Review) to 178.792 billion barrels (Oil & Gas Journal). Obviously, this extremely wide range of guesses shows that no one truly knows how much oil Canada has.)

Since I wrote this, I've gotten a better understanding with respect to Canada's oil reserves. The problem with the Canadian oil sands is that it is made up of a very dense and viscous type of petroleum called bitumen. Bitumen is like molasses at room temperature, and needs heating just to flow. (The tar that we pave roads with is bitumen.) Oil refineries are set up to process certain types of crude oils, and bitumen is normally not one of them. So, while Canada has a lot of proved oil reserves, most of it is not in the form the refineries need to produce products like gasoline. In this respect, the lower reserve amount mentioned above is probably closer to the amount of crude oil Canada actually has. In time, more refineries may convert to take advantage of the Canadian oil sands, but that will probably be a gradual process.

4. Persian Gulf oil, which has ranged between 19.81% and 28.56% of all U.S. imports since 1996, will probably continue to hover in the high teens-low 20s, despite President Bush's goal to cut American consumption of Middle Eastern oil by 75% by 2025, per the latest State of the Union address.

I don't see this forecast changing at all. What President Bush said in 2006 about cutting the amount of Middle Eastern oil America consumes was complete and utter bullshit (and shame on you if you believed him). BTW, shame on you again if you believe either McCain or Cheney that drilling for oil offshore or up in Alaska will make a significant difference. Two reasons: "drop in the bucket" and "long-term projects," neither of which will lower your gas prices. I may post on this in the near future, insha'allah, but in the meantime I recommend that you read John McCain's Oil Scam over at Informed Comment (Juan Cole), and Drilling Our Way to... by Menzie Chinn over at Econbrowser.


References:
US Crude Oil Supply and Disposition (DoE)
US Crude Oil Imports by Country of Origin (DoE)

Notes:
* OPEC countries include Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Venezuela.
** Persian Gulf countries include Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. However, Iran and Qatar export no oil to the U.S.

The Economist: Just What Do They Dislike, and Why?

An article in this week's The Economist about the new book by John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks For Islam? The article's primary criticism about the book is that the data was taken from the annual Gallup World Poll and that, at a cost of $28,500 for the full results of that poll, "...it's hard for ordinary folk to judge exactly how fair the authors have been in mining their own data." Otherwise, the results are generally positive:

The authors rehearse several arguments that make sense to anybody who knows the Muslim world. Rather than despising Western freedom, many Muslims admire it, but they scoff at Western claims to be promoting democracy. Muslim women want greater equality, but they are attached to their faith and culture, and hackles can rise when Westerners set out to "liberate" them. The minority of Muslims (7%) who fully approve the September 2001 attacks are not much more pious than average; so religiosity doesn't seem to be what makes them violent. In one survey, over two-thirds of Muslim respondents called America aggressive, while the proportion who took a similar view of France or Germany was under 10%. So democracy as such isn't a Muslim bugbear.

The article also reports on another poll which had was released this past week:

The results of a more narrowly focused survey, by another American pollster, were released this week. They are a troubling read for the Bush administration. A poll by Zogby International of 4,000 people in six Arab countries—Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—found rising numbers had a "very unfavorable" view of America. And compared with a similar poll in 2006, an increasing number (67% versus 61%) thought Iran had every right to pursue its nuclear activities. Whatever one believes about the Muslim soul, Mr Bush's efforts to court the Sunni world, ahead of a possible showdown with Iran, seem not to have impressed the Arab street.

"Monsters to Destroy" - How America Creates Its Own Blowback

An interesting interview with Dr. Thomas Woods on a website I've never visited before (for the obvious reason ;) ). The interview, entitled "Monsters to Destroy: Foreign Policy, Then and Now," looks at how American modern foreign policy (say, from WW1 onwards) has created severe problems (i.e., blowback) for itself by intervening in the affairs of others. What makes matters worse for Americans is that, as one blogger put it, "It’s sad when Osama Bin Laden makes more sense than Americans do." A couple of quotes:

One insight that conservatives have long had is that when you intervene in the domestic market, you always have unintended consequences. Put a price control on milk and make milk less expensive and pretty soon, you'll have shortages, because no one is producing milk anymore and the discounted milk was bought up. That's what happens.

Foreign affairs are even more likely to have unintended consequences. Woodrow Wilson did not intend to exacerbate every existing problem in Europe by intervening in World War I. But that's what he did, and he helped create the fertile soil for the rise of a hyper nationalistic party like the Nazis.

...

In the 1980s, the Ayatollah Khomeini called for a jihad against America, on the grounds that we were degenerate, had filthy movies, our women didn't know their place -- all the reasons that we've been told are the causes of the current attacks. The result was absolutely nothing. No one blew himself up. No one did anything. Khomeini issued the call and there was no interest. It was a total flop -- no one wanted to sacrifice himself on those grounds.

Then the 1990s come along, and we have Osama bin Laden. He does not make that fundamental cultural critique -- obviously, he doesn't like those aspects of American culture, but that wasn't his main critique.

His criticism is actually very specific. He says the U.S. is responsible for propping up police states around the Arab world; exercising undue influence over oil markets; showing undue favoritism toward Israel; supporting countries that oppress their Muslim minorities; basing American troops on the Arabian peninsula, and on and on.

This is the sort of thing he offers as a rationale. So while there may certainly be the potential for Islam to be violent, what sparks that fire? It's the combination of practical grievances and the Islamist ideology. Some people will do battle on behalf of an abstract philosophy, but most people will only fight and die for a specific grievance. For example, when you look at the Al Qaida recruitment tapes, they don't simply quote from the Koran. They actually show images of people killed by U.S. weapons.

Why are they making those tapes if there's no connection between U.S. foreign policy and what the terrorists are doing? It just doesn't make sense.

Some of the comments were also interesting. One man asked, "What about Beirut?" (Meaning, the 1983 bombing of the American and French barracks in Beirut.) One very good response was:

Heeding the advice of then-national security adviser Robert McFarlane, President Ronald Reagan authorized the USS New Jersey to fire long-distance shells into Muslim villages in the Bekaa Valley, killing civilians and convincing Shiite militants that the United States had joined the conflict.

On Oct. 23, 1983, Shiite militants struck back, sending a suicide truck bomber through U.S. security positions and demolishing the high-rise Marine barracks. “When the shells started falling on the Shiites, they assumed the American ‘referee’ had taken sides,” Gen. Colin Powell wrote about the incident in his memoirs, My American Journey.

Petroleum and Natural Gas Proven Reserves, 2008, Top 10

Update: Please click on the link for the 2009 Petroleum and Natural Gas Proved Reserves.

The Energy Information Administration, a department of the U.S. Department of Energy, has recently released the 2008 proved reserves for petroleum and natural gas. Proved reserves are the amount of oil and gas in the ground that is "reasonably certain" to be extracted using current technology at current prices. The following are lists of the top ten countries for petroleum and natural gas proved reserves, with their quantities and percentage of the world total for 2008:

Petroleum - Billion Barrels
1. Saudi Arabia - 266.75 (20.03%)
2. Canada - 178.59 (13.41%)
3. Iran - 138.40 (10.39%)
4. Iraq - 115.00 (8.64%)
5. Kuwait - 104.00 (7.81%)
6. United Arab Emirates - 97.80 (7.34%)
7. Venezuela - 87.04 (6.54%)
8. Russian Federation - 60.00 (4.51%)
9. Libya - 41.46 (3.11%)
10. Nigeria - 36.22 (2.72%)

Notes: The world total of proved reserves is 1,331.70 billion barrels of petroleum. The total of the top ten countries makes up 84.50% of the world's proved reserves. Canada's proved reserves are estimated to be 5.4 billion barrels of conventional crude oil and 173.2 billion barrels of oil sands reserves. (Oil sands are much more costly to refine than conventional crude oil.)


Natural Gas - Trillion Cubic Feet
1. Russian Federation - 1,680.000 (27.16%)
2. Iran - 948.200 (15.33%)
3. Qatar - 905.300 (14.64%)
4. Saudi Arabia - 253.107 (4.09%)
5. United Arab Emirates - 214.400 (3.47%)
6. United States - 211.085 (3.41%)
7. Nigeria - 183.990 (2.97%)
8. Venezuela - 166.260 (2.69%)
9. Algeria - 159.000 (2.57%)
10. Iraq - 111.940 (1.81%)

Notes: The world total of proved reserves is 6,185.694 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The total of the top ten countries makes up 78.14% of the world's proved reserves. Venezuela moved past Algeria into the 8th spot for the 2008 listing, having been listed 9th last year.

Drop the Falafel, and Put Your Hands Up!

A strange story out of CQ Politics the other day; apparently, the FBI had been trying to data mine Bay area grocery stores in an effort to find Iranian terrorists:

Like Hansel and Gretel hoping to follow their bread crumbs out of the forest, the FBI sifted through customer data collected by San Francisco-area grocery stores in 2005 and 2006, hoping that sales records of Middle Eastern food would lead to Iranian terrorists.

The idea was that a spike in, say, falafel sales, combined with other data, would lead to Iranian secret agents in the south San Francisco-San Jose area.

The brainchild of top FBI counterterrorism officials Phil Mudd and Willie T. Hulon, according to well-informed sources, the project didn’t last long. It was torpedoed by the head of the FBI’s criminal investigations division, Michael A. Mason, who argued that putting somebody on a terrorist list for what they ate was ridiculous — and possibly illegal.

A check of federal court records in California did not reveal any prosecutions developed from falafel trails.

...

As ridiculous as it sounds, the groceries counting scheme is a measure of how desperate the FBI is to disrupt domestic terrorism plots.

Of course, if the FBI really believes tracking falafel sales will lead them to terrorists and their sympathizers, they might just start with this man: