This particular episode first aired two years ago, but Milady and I watched it tonight (a recording I made yesterday from the Australia Network). The two young women (click on the link below) lived for two weeks in the other's home and got to experience both the religious and cultural practices of their counterpart's families.
What I found rather interesting was how these two women reacted to their experiences. The Jewish woman was truly a fish out of water, and couldn't wait to drink a beer as soon as she could after leaving. (One wonders what happened to the English language translation of the Qur'an she was given as a parting gift.) The Muslim woman, on the other hand, realized that she felt the most comfortable with traditional, orthodox Islamic beliefs and practices. After her stay with the Jewish family, she felt she was a better Muslim for having gone through the experience.
Holy Switch - Episode 3
Showing posts with label Muslims. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Muslims. Show all posts
June 6, 2015
August 25, 2013
Banu Islam
On the whole, humanity is rather immature. We are born this way and it normally takes us at least two decades, if not more, to reach a level of cognitive and behavioral maturity that is acceptable to ourselves and society. This level of maturity is taught to us through many means, one of which is the institution of religion. Most religions, including Islam, seek to mature humanity. In Islam, we Muslims mature through our submission to Allah (swt) by conforming to His rules and legislation, which is presented to us in the form of shari'ah. The rules and legislation by which we mature aren't onerous, but they do take a significant level of discipline and determination in order to be carried out successfully and consistently.
This "discipline and determination" is known to us as jihad. It is the greater jihad, the jihad by which we seek to control and contain our nafs, our ego. Those of us who are parents (and I am the father to a five-year-old daughter) see the need to control the nafs daily through our children. "Abah, I want this! Ibu, I want that!" As children get older, their desires become more sophisticated, but their maturity levels also increase as well, insha'allah. People usually get to a point where their material needs are met, but their maturity levels have also plateaued.
The problem is that these maturity levels may or may not have reached their full potential. Have each of us met that full level of maturity? For example, consider three types of behavior: drinking alcohol, gambling and tattooing. All three behaviors are considered both legal (usually) and acceptable within modern non-Muslim society. But even while these behaviors may be acceptable in non-Muslim society, they are considered unacceptable among Muslims.
Engaging in these behaviors are signs of immaturity. An immature person wastes his or her money on alcoholic drinks that can cause numerous individual and societal problems (let alone being a poison to one's body). Through gambling, an immature person wastes his or her money in the unlikely possibility of winning a large payoff. Through tattooing, an immature person "decorates" his or her body with art that is often regretted (and sometimes removed) later in life. A Muslim avoids these immature behaviors altogether, thus bypassing the pain these behaviors may cause to themselves and to others.
Instead of engaging in immature behaviors, the Muslim engages in mature behaviors, especially that of salat (prayer), sawm (fasting), and zakat (and saudaqah, the giving of charity). Each of these behaviors are not only mandated as part of the Five Pillars of Islam, but are of supreme importance for increasing and maintaining the maturity level of Muslims individually and as a society. Salat is of primary importance. It not only restores our focus on Allah (swt) throughout the day, but also helps us to remember (through the various surahs we recite in the individual rakah) what we need to do for society as a whole.
Sawm is similar to salat except that, instead of being an intellectual reminder, sawm is visceral. We feel the hunger that the less-fortunate undergo so that we may acutely understand their needs and be motivated to help society. And, whereas salat and sawm are reminders for action, zakat and saudaqah are the actions themselves, the actual giving of charity to the poor, either directly to those in need, or indirectly, to agencies who will help us distribute the charity to others.
It should be noted that the giving of zakat and, especially, saudaqah goes not only to other Muslims in need, but also to non-Muslims as well. Muslims must act as khalifa, guardians of the community and the environment, to help in the process of maturing humanity, whether the individuals are Muslims or not. In that respect we try to be like the tide, lifting all boats together. We are lifting not only our community but that of the non-Muslim community as well.
Ideally, our goal should be to strive to bring everyone up to the minimum levels (myself included) that are expected of all Muslims in Islam. There are probably very few people who don't fail in one aspect of Islam or another. Are we only meeting what is expected of us with regard to the five pillars (especially that of salat, sawm, and zakat/saudaqah) but of the other aspects of a Muslim lifestyle as well? For example, do we behave with the proper adab? Do we eat halal food consistently, especially in those places where halal food and drink is not so easily available? Do we cover ourselves properly, both men and women, and lower our gaze appropriately, both men and women? Do we minimize our exposure to the negative aspects of our culture (especially as broadcast through the media and entertainment industries)? Do we minimize our exposure to the negative aspects of our economy, such as with regard to interest and casino capitalism as a whole? (I realize this last part is extremely difficult given the pervasiveness of the global interest-based economy. Still, does one try?) Islam addresses all of these issues and provides solutions for the maturation of humanity, but do we listen and implement these solutions into our lives?
Just as parents set limits on their children's behavior, Islam has set limits on our behaviors. Some, the immature, may whine and complain about those limits (with a few going into outright rebellion and/or apostasy because their egos cannot handle those limitations). However, the majority of us understand how we benefit from such self-restraint. One has only to look at the troubles plaguing the non-Muslim world, created by their indulgence in various vices, to see what we can and do avoid: the loss of wealth through gambling or the purchase of alcohol and/or drugs, the increased chance of illnesses through the consumption of alcohol, drugs or other haram products, the spread of sexually-transmitted diseases, especially through zina, the loss and heartbreak of families split apart after cases of adultery, and so on. Moreover, these limitations are lifelong. We do not "graduate" from the limitations once we reach a certain age. Most, if not all, of these limitations will remain with us until death.
What also makes matters difficult is that many of these limitations have little or no ability to be enforced externally; they must be enforced internally. For example, governments can and do enforce some Islamic limitations (even by secular governments) to one degree or another. The sale of alcohol might be restricted to certain hours or prohibited altogether; the sale of various drugs may be strictly regulated or prohibited, depending upon the substance, and so forth. But other Islamic limitations are not enforced by various governments except in certain select cases; for example, riba, zina and adultery. Thus, the individual is left to him- or herself to maintain the limitations. This is the reason for the greater jihad. Can we maintain our ability as individuals and as a society to reach our full potential?
I began to write this essay last December while vacationing in Japan and reading one of Frank Herbert's Dune novels. It is unfinished, from my perspective, and perhaps I will finish it in the future, insha'allah. A couple months ago, I came across another essay, Psychology, Islam & Self-Control, that says much of what I'm trying to say here. I recommend that you read that essay as well.
June 26, 2013
Bill Cosby: We Should Be More Like Muslims
This actually came out a couple weeks ago in the Rupert Murdoch-owned New York Post (no less). Bill Cosby had written an op-ed that didn't seem to gather much notice (at least from what I could observe here in Singapore); however, Bill wrote two paragraphs near the very bottom of his essay that I thought were very interesting. He wrote:
Spot on, Bill! (Although I do think it'd be better if more Americans embraced Islam anyway.) But had more conservatives read these two paragraphs, I think we'd have seen more heads exploding. ;)
I’m a Christian. But Muslims are misunderstood. Intentionally misunderstood. We should all be more like them. They make sense, especially with their children. There is no other group like the Black Muslims, who put so much effort into teaching children the right things, they don’t smoke, they don’t drink or overindulge in alcohol, they protect their women, they command respect. And what do these other people do?
They complain about them, they criticize them. We’d be a better world if we emulated them. We don’t have to become black Muslims, but we can embrace the things that work.
Spot on, Bill! (Although I do think it'd be better if more Americans embraced Islam anyway.) But had more conservatives read these two paragraphs, I think we'd have seen more heads exploding. ;)
April 19, 2012
February 21, 2012
NYT: Uncle Sam is No Imam
The following comes from the New York Times article, Uncle Sam is No Imam:
For the most part I am in agreement with this article, but these two sections really stood out for me. Any attempt to create an "official Islam" as defined by a government is bound for failure. It's not just the idea of trying to soften the more radical teachings of Islam for young Muslims, Muslims of all ages will resist any attempt by non-Muslims, whether they are individuals or organizations, to reinterpret any aspect of Islam that is solely for the benefit of non-Muslim society.
The fact of the matter is that the vast majority of non-Muslims have little understanding about Islam and the Muslim world to begin with. Orthodox Muslims would look at these "interpretations" then ignore them. There are several key factors at play here. One, of course, is the interpretation itself; the interpretation must be grounded by the Qur'an and Sunnah of the Prophet (pbuh). The more an interpretation diverges from the general understanding of the Qur'an and Sunnah, the less likely that interpretation will be accepted. Extremes in interpretation, both "liberal" and "conservative," are ignored by the mainstream Muslim community (although fringe individuals or groups may accept these interpretations at the risk of being considered outside of pale of Islam; for example, the Nation of Islam and the Ahmadiyyah). As a result, minority interpretations in Islam count for very little within the Muslim world.
Another key factor is the credibility of the person or group issuing the interpretation. As the author pointed out, young Muslims will not accept the FBI's interpretation of Islam; the FBI has no credibility in Islam. Muslims, by and large, never accept a non-Muslim's interpretation of Islam; non-Muslims have no credibility.* Muslims, by and large, will also not accept the interpretations of other Muslims who present minority positions and have no evidence of being a Muslim scholar (this also applies to scholars in academia who happen to be Muslim). In essence, the only interpretations Muslims as a whole will accept are those made by Muslim scholars whose work is more-or-less orthodox in interpretation. This system may not be to the liking of non-Muslims and those Muslims who wish for rapid change, but the system works well for mainstream orthodox Muslims. As the Prophet (pbuh) said, My ummah will not agree upon an error." (Sunan At-Tirmidhi, #2320; see also Sunan Abu Dawud, #4255 and Sunan Ibn Majah, #4085)
So, what is to be done? The author had some good ideas:
The real key, in my opinion, is that non-Muslim society must listen to orthodox Muslims. Really, it's gotten to the point where, if authorities want the help of the Muslim community, they must be willing to listen and respect what the orthodox Muslim community has to say. A good first step would be to reject what non-Muslims think about Islam and Muslim society. There are far too many shysters who prey upon the gullible non-Muslim public (including leaders) for information and advice about Islam and Muslims. If you want the backing of orthodox Muslims, you must listen to credible orthodox Muslims, even if this means not liking what those people have to say. That may be a bitter pill for some non-Muslims to take, but it's the best way to understand Islam and the Muslim community and to reduce tensions between the two sides.
-----------------
* Having said that, I have come across the works of a few non-Muslims whose understanding of Islam is very good; they do have some credibility among Muslims, although not enough to be able to present divergent interpretations that would be acceptable to Muslim society.
From a national security point of view, challenging ideas that underpin radical Islam makes sense. Counterterrorism is ultimately about ideas; why shouldn’t officials try to marginalize the theological teachings cited by violent terrorists?
The problem is that when American officials intervene in Islamic teachings — interpreting them to believers in a national-security context and saying which are or are not acceptable — they create tensions, both legal and strategic.
The strategic problem is easier to see: Is the government a credible authority on Islamic interpretation? Based on the results of comparable efforts in Britain, the answer is a resounding no. Simply put, young Muslim men in the thrall of radical teachings will not embrace a more pacific theology because the F.B.I. tells them to, any more than Catholic bishops would have yielded to Mr. Obama’s plan to mandate coverage of contraceptives at Catholic hospitals if he had invoked canon law to defend his position.
...
If I am right that the government is increasingly in danger of establishing an “official Islam,” a project that is at best ill-fated if not illegal...
For the most part I am in agreement with this article, but these two sections really stood out for me. Any attempt to create an "official Islam" as defined by a government is bound for failure. It's not just the idea of trying to soften the more radical teachings of Islam for young Muslims, Muslims of all ages will resist any attempt by non-Muslims, whether they are individuals or organizations, to reinterpret any aspect of Islam that is solely for the benefit of non-Muslim society.
The fact of the matter is that the vast majority of non-Muslims have little understanding about Islam and the Muslim world to begin with. Orthodox Muslims would look at these "interpretations" then ignore them. There are several key factors at play here. One, of course, is the interpretation itself; the interpretation must be grounded by the Qur'an and Sunnah of the Prophet (pbuh). The more an interpretation diverges from the general understanding of the Qur'an and Sunnah, the less likely that interpretation will be accepted. Extremes in interpretation, both "liberal" and "conservative," are ignored by the mainstream Muslim community (although fringe individuals or groups may accept these interpretations at the risk of being considered outside of pale of Islam; for example, the Nation of Islam and the Ahmadiyyah). As a result, minority interpretations in Islam count for very little within the Muslim world.
Another key factor is the credibility of the person or group issuing the interpretation. As the author pointed out, young Muslims will not accept the FBI's interpretation of Islam; the FBI has no credibility in Islam. Muslims, by and large, never accept a non-Muslim's interpretation of Islam; non-Muslims have no credibility.* Muslims, by and large, will also not accept the interpretations of other Muslims who present minority positions and have no evidence of being a Muslim scholar (this also applies to scholars in academia who happen to be Muslim). In essence, the only interpretations Muslims as a whole will accept are those made by Muslim scholars whose work is more-or-less orthodox in interpretation. This system may not be to the liking of non-Muslims and those Muslims who wish for rapid change, but the system works well for mainstream orthodox Muslims. As the Prophet (pbuh) said, My ummah will not agree upon an error." (Sunan At-Tirmidhi, #2320; see also Sunan Abu Dawud, #4255 and Sunan Ibn Majah, #4085)
So, what is to be done? The author had some good ideas:
Countering radical religious ideology is on much more solid constitutional — and strategic — footing if the heavy lifting is done not by the government but by grass-roots organizations that are grounded in civil society or in religious communities. The government must not be heavily and directly involved.
The relationship between the national security imperative and a great religious civilization is inevitably fraught. Reconciling the two won’t be achieved by allowing officials to become more active in espousing theological alternatives to radical Islam — or in training law-enforcement and intelligence professionals with hateful caricatures of Islam. The government’s efforts ought to be guided instead by the wisdom of the First Amendment and the values that it enshrines.
The real key, in my opinion, is that non-Muslim society must listen to orthodox Muslims. Really, it's gotten to the point where, if authorities want the help of the Muslim community, they must be willing to listen and respect what the orthodox Muslim community has to say. A good first step would be to reject what non-Muslims think about Islam and Muslim society. There are far too many shysters who prey upon the gullible non-Muslim public (including leaders) for information and advice about Islam and Muslims. If you want the backing of orthodox Muslims, you must listen to credible orthodox Muslims, even if this means not liking what those people have to say. That may be a bitter pill for some non-Muslims to take, but it's the best way to understand Islam and the Muslim community and to reduce tensions between the two sides.
-----------------
* Having said that, I have come across the works of a few non-Muslims whose understanding of Islam is very good; they do have some credibility among Muslims, although not enough to be able to present divergent interpretations that would be acceptable to Muslim society.
November 13, 2011
A Road to Mecca
From: Al-Jazeera World/Al-Jazeera English:
In A Road to Mecca, filmmaker George Misch sets out to explore the frontline between the Muslim world and the West. His guide for this journey is a man from the past - somebody who, 80 years earlier, crossed all boundaries between countries, cultures and religions.
Leopold Weiss was born a Jew on the edge of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1900. But his story would unfold far away in the deserts of Arabia.
Feeling restless and unhappy in Europe, in 1922 Weiss accepted an uncle's invitation to join him in Jerusalem. But what began as a family visit soon turned into a life-changing journey.
Weiss enjoyed the hospitality of the Arabs he met in the Middle East and was enchanted by their lifestyle. With the passion of an explorer, he began to travel across the region.
His travels and encounters nurtured in him a sense that Zionism was causing a great injustice to the Palestinian Arabs. In Jerusalem, he got into heated arguments with the leaders of the Zionist movement and began to feel at a greater distance from the religion of his ancestors than ever before.
"Islam should be presented without any fanaticism. Without any stress on our having the only possible way and the others are lost. Moderation in all forms is a basic demand of Islam."
Muhammad Asad
As he discovered the Muslims of the Middle East, Weiss also discovered Islam - studying the Qur'an and finding not only the answer to the spiritual emptiness he had felt but also an alternative to the materialism of Europe's Roaring Twenties. In Saudi Arabia, Weiss felt truly at home, writing: "I am no longer a stranger."
In 1926, he converted to Islam and changed his name to Muhammad Asad. Full of enthusiasm, he embarked upon his first pilgrimage to Mecca.
Curious to get to know other Muslim communities, in 1932 Asad left Saudi Arabia - traveling to Turkistan, China and Indonesia. In India, he met poet and philosopher Muhammad Iqbal. Iqbal dreamed of creating a separate Islamic state as a solution to the bloodshed between Indian Muslims and Hindus. Iqbal's vision of Pakistan quickly became Asad's own dream.
Asad campaigned for the creation of Pakistan by writing books, giving public lectures and hosting radio programs. He also drafted the outline for an Islamic constitution in which equal rights for women were secured.
In 1951, Asad became Pakistan's envoy to the United Nations. But to his dismay he was forced out of the position after just one year. Deeply disappointed, he turned his back on politics, deciding instead to write his autobiography in the hope that it would promote better understanding between Muslims and the West. The Road to Mecca quickly became a bestseller.
By 1970, Asad had grown increasingly concerned that the Qur'an was being misinterpreted and misused for political goals. This motivated him to undertake his biggest challenge: a new translation of and commentary on the Qur'an. He settled in Morocco and estimated that it would take him four years to complete. Seventeen years later it was finished. He dedicated it to "people who think."
"Every age requires a new approach to the Qur'an for the simple reason that the Qur'an is made for all ages. It is our duty to look for deeper meanings in the Qur'an in order to increase our knowledge and experience. The Qur'an wants your intellect to be always active and trying to approach the message of God. God himself dedicated this book to people who think."
Muhammad Asad
Despite the fact that Asad today has a loyal following among those who share an interest in his writings and an intellectual affiliation with him, his translation was not embraced by all. Rumor has it that there were even book burnings of Asad's Qur'an.
Emotionally and financially exhausted, he withdrew to Europe - settling in Spain in 1987. He planned to revise his translation once more but old age and prolonged illness prevented him from completing it. On February 20, 1992, he died, alone and secluded.
February 25, 2011
Taqwa
Karmakin, on the About "magic underwear" diary, wrote:
Now my purpose in writing this essay is not to call Karmakin out, but to give my reasons as to why "God-fearing" is, at least to me, a beautiful term.
One of the problems with the English language is that, although it is an extremely flexible language, it occasionally suffers from a blurriness of expression. The classic example is that of "hot." For example, your friend is eating Mexican food and he or she says the food is "hot." "Hot hot or spicy hot?" you might ask. But if you spoke Bahasa Melayu, the Malay language, the friend would have originally said that the food was either panas (of a hot temperature) or padas (spicy hot). There would have been no linguistic confusion to begin with.
Arabic has a similar differentiation with regard to the word "fear." In Arabic, the word for what could be considered normal "fear," the "emotion caused by [an] actual or perceived danger or threat" (per Wiktionary), comes from the root خ و ف (khā wāw fā). The word for "fear" that comes from this root is "khawf." (The only other primary word that comes from this root that is used in the Qur'an is "threaten.") An example of a Qur'anic verse that uses "khawf" is 2:62:
The Muslims, Christians, Jews, Sabians and any others who meet the conditions listed in this verse would not fear the potential physical torment of hell because, insha'allah, they would be going to jannah (heaven) instead.
However, when the Qur'an talks about "fearing Allah (swt)," the root normally used is و ق ي (wāw qāf yā). The most prominent word that comes from this root is taqwa; however, the meaning of taqwa is somewhat more complex than simply "fear" in the sense of "extreme veneration or awe." According to the Quranic Arabic Corpus, a fantastic concordance of the Qur'an produced by the University of Leeds (UK), taqwa has a number of meanings, including "protect," "righteous" and "righteousness," "save," "piety," "God-conscious" and, of course, "fear."
But the word taqwa, even among Muslims, can be difficult to fully comprehend. A number of people over the centuries have tried to define or describe taqwa. Yusuf Ali (1872-1953), an Indian translator of the Qur'an into English, wrote that the fear with regard to the fear of Allah (swt) should be "the reverence which is akin to love, for it fears to do anything which is not pleasing to the object of love" (footnote 427 to verse 3:102).
Ali ibn Abi Talib (c. 598 - 661 CE), the fourth Caliph of the Muslim empire, defined taqwa as being "the fear of Jaleel (Allah), acting upon the tanzeel (Quran), being content with qaleel (little), and preparing for the day of raheel (journeying from this world)."
The Sufi Shaykh Hafiz Ghulam Habib (1904-1989) defined taqwa as "the shunning of everything and anything that causes a deficiency in one’s relationship with Allah."
However, the description I like the best comes from the following hadith:
So, for me, a God-fearing person is truly an upstanding individual. And there's nothing "ugly" about that.
A good example is our cultural use of "god-fearing" as meaning a upstanding individual. (Ugly term really if you think about it)...
Now my purpose in writing this essay is not to call Karmakin out, but to give my reasons as to why "God-fearing" is, at least to me, a beautiful term.
One of the problems with the English language is that, although it is an extremely flexible language, it occasionally suffers from a blurriness of expression. The classic example is that of "hot." For example, your friend is eating Mexican food and he or she says the food is "hot." "Hot hot or spicy hot?" you might ask. But if you spoke Bahasa Melayu, the Malay language, the friend would have originally said that the food was either panas (of a hot temperature) or padas (spicy hot). There would have been no linguistic confusion to begin with.
Arabic has a similar differentiation with regard to the word "fear." In Arabic, the word for what could be considered normal "fear," the "emotion caused by [an] actual or perceived danger or threat" (per Wiktionary), comes from the root خ و ف (khā wāw fā). The word for "fear" that comes from this root is "khawf." (The only other primary word that comes from this root that is used in the Qur'an is "threaten.") An example of a Qur'anic verse that uses "khawf" is 2:62:
Those who believe (in the Qur'an), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians,- any who believe in God and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve.
The Muslims, Christians, Jews, Sabians and any others who meet the conditions listed in this verse would not fear the potential physical torment of hell because, insha'allah, they would be going to jannah (heaven) instead.
However, when the Qur'an talks about "fearing Allah (swt)," the root normally used is و ق ي (wāw qāf yā). The most prominent word that comes from this root is taqwa; however, the meaning of taqwa is somewhat more complex than simply "fear" in the sense of "extreme veneration or awe." According to the Quranic Arabic Corpus, a fantastic concordance of the Qur'an produced by the University of Leeds (UK), taqwa has a number of meanings, including "protect," "righteous" and "righteousness," "save," "piety," "God-conscious" and, of course, "fear."
But the word taqwa, even among Muslims, can be difficult to fully comprehend. A number of people over the centuries have tried to define or describe taqwa. Yusuf Ali (1872-1953), an Indian translator of the Qur'an into English, wrote that the fear with regard to the fear of Allah (swt) should be "the reverence which is akin to love, for it fears to do anything which is not pleasing to the object of love" (footnote 427 to verse 3:102).
Ali ibn Abi Talib (c. 598 - 661 CE), the fourth Caliph of the Muslim empire, defined taqwa as being "the fear of Jaleel (Allah), acting upon the tanzeel (Quran), being content with qaleel (little), and preparing for the day of raheel (journeying from this world)."
The Sufi Shaykh Hafiz Ghulam Habib (1904-1989) defined taqwa as "the shunning of everything and anything that causes a deficiency in one’s relationship with Allah."
However, the description I like the best comes from the following hadith:
Hadrat Umar ibn Khattab (R.A) once asked Hadrat Ibn Ka’ab (R.A) the definition of taqwa. In reply Hadrat Ibn Ka’ab asked, “Have you ever had to traverse a thorny path?” Hadrat Umar replied in the affirmative and Hadrat Ka’ab continued, “How do you do so?”
Hadrat Umar said that he would carefully walk through after first having collected all loose and flowing clothing in his hands so nothing gets caught in the thorns hence injuring him. Hadrat Ka’ab said, “This is the definition of taqwa, to protect oneself from sin through life’s dangerous journey so that one can successfully complete the journey unscathed by sin.”
So, for me, a God-fearing person is truly an upstanding individual. And there's nothing "ugly" about that.
February 17, 2011
Why Aren't Democrats Doing Health Care?
Last week, I published a comment about the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) that discussed the MB's social services to Egyptians and wondered why the Democratic Party in the United States wasn't doing something similar:
Yesterday, I received an e-mail from the Muslim American Society (MAS) featuring an article in the Gainesville Sun that was originally published on February 9th. The article is about a free medical clinic that the Gainesville Muslim community is setting up (opening on the 26th) that will provide primary and preventative medicine, insha'allah, to adults and children, regardless of race, religion or ethnicity. The clinic is being run by volunteers and paid for through donations.
Now, rhetorical questions I would ask of my fellow Democrats are: Do you think this clinic will become popular with the local community? Do you think the Muslim community in Gainesville will benefit from a PR-perspective by opening this clinic? Do you think the Democratic Party, which is much better funded than a small group of Muslims, would benefit with electoral support if they were to help fund/run these types of clinics nationwide? (Even if these clinics were not run or funded directly by the DNC, they could be run through a foundation created by the DNC, as Singapore's dominant political party, the People's Action Party (PAP), does with their charitable foundation.)
I see groups like the MB, CAIR, MAS, etc., as organizations working for the greater good of humanity. The Democratic party in the US could learn a thing or two from the MB and their feet-on-the-ground social services. (Americans need health care? Why haven't the Democrats started up free or low-cost clinics for these people? Don't they think these people won't remember on election day?)
Yesterday, I received an e-mail from the Muslim American Society (MAS) featuring an article in the Gainesville Sun that was originally published on February 9th. The article is about a free medical clinic that the Gainesville Muslim community is setting up (opening on the 26th) that will provide primary and preventative medicine, insha'allah, to adults and children, regardless of race, religion or ethnicity. The clinic is being run by volunteers and paid for through donations.
Now, rhetorical questions I would ask of my fellow Democrats are: Do you think this clinic will become popular with the local community? Do you think the Muslim community in Gainesville will benefit from a PR-perspective by opening this clinic? Do you think the Democratic Party, which is much better funded than a small group of Muslims, would benefit with electoral support if they were to help fund/run these types of clinics nationwide? (Even if these clinics were not run or funded directly by the DNC, they could be run through a foundation created by the DNC, as Singapore's dominant political party, the People's Action Party (PAP), does with their charitable foundation.)
February 11, 2011
Are Muslims Sexually Repressed?
The original question asked was:
And I answered:
To which the followup question was:
And my response is:
I don't view any of these things as being indicative of "sexual repression." Homosexuality and sex outside of marriage is forbidden especially so as to prevent the spread of various diseases; likewise, sex outside of marriage is forbidden so as to give any resulting child from any sexual activity the chance to grow up within a nuclear family, supported by both parents both emotionally and financially. As for gender segregation, this is done only to prevent improper behavior between the sexes.
The thing about "modest dress" and, indeed, the entire notion of "sexual repression" among Muslims is that what non-Muslims see is merely our public face, what we Muslims want you to see. What you don't see is the private face of Muslim life away from non-Muslims. The dress codes for both men and women are indeed about modesty, piety and avoiding improper behavior, but that has nothing to do with Muslim family life, when the hijab comes off. For me, sexual repression is about the fundamental attitudes people have toward sexual behavior: procreation only vs. procreation and pleasure vs. pleasure only. Islam definitely encourages the middle view: procreation and pleasure. We love to have sex for the pleasurable and loving experience, but we also love kids (and I think the demographic statistics bear that latter statement out; certainly the Christians are worried about Muslim birth rates).
So I would say, don't confuse what you see with reality. :) By this I mean, seek to understand the reasoning behind what the Qur'an and Sunnah command, whether that thing is allowed or forbidden. The biggest problem Islamophobes have in understanding Islam and Muslim culture is that they take almost everything at face value and react off of what they see. But they have little to no understanding of the deeper meanings or reasonings behind our concepts and behaviors. These people the Qur'an compares with the "lolling dog" (7:176) or cattle (7:179, 25:44, 47:12). The Qur'an really does expect Muslims to understand the deeper meanings, not just what lies on the surface.
Are American (or even non-Muslim Asian) cultures really more sexually repressed than Islamic cultures?
And I answered:
I'm not convinced that Islamic cultures (or, at the very least, Islamic culture here in SE Asia) are as sexually repressed as you might think. All these kids aren't delivered by stork, ya know! ;) However, Muslims generally believe that private matters between husband and wife stay within the family and are not discussed with others. And I think that this lack of discussion outside the family may be creating a perception among non-Muslims that Muslims are sexually repressed when we're not. (And the same reasoning may explain other groups, such as American conservative protestants who also have a perception of being sexually repressed.)
To which the followup question was:
How so -- isn't Islam pretty unequivocal about condemning homosexuality and sex outside of marriage?
Islam also requires a strict code of modest dress, and sex segregation is part of many Muslim cultures.
What definition of "sexual repression" are you using?
And my response is:
I don't view any of these things as being indicative of "sexual repression." Homosexuality and sex outside of marriage is forbidden especially so as to prevent the spread of various diseases; likewise, sex outside of marriage is forbidden so as to give any resulting child from any sexual activity the chance to grow up within a nuclear family, supported by both parents both emotionally and financially. As for gender segregation, this is done only to prevent improper behavior between the sexes.
The thing about "modest dress" and, indeed, the entire notion of "sexual repression" among Muslims is that what non-Muslims see is merely our public face, what we Muslims want you to see. What you don't see is the private face of Muslim life away from non-Muslims. The dress codes for both men and women are indeed about modesty, piety and avoiding improper behavior, but that has nothing to do with Muslim family life, when the hijab comes off. For me, sexual repression is about the fundamental attitudes people have toward sexual behavior: procreation only vs. procreation and pleasure vs. pleasure only. Islam definitely encourages the middle view: procreation and pleasure. We love to have sex for the pleasurable and loving experience, but we also love kids (and I think the demographic statistics bear that latter statement out; certainly the Christians are worried about Muslim birth rates).
So I would say, don't confuse what you see with reality. :) By this I mean, seek to understand the reasoning behind what the Qur'an and Sunnah command, whether that thing is allowed or forbidden. The biggest problem Islamophobes have in understanding Islam and Muslim culture is that they take almost everything at face value and react off of what they see. But they have little to no understanding of the deeper meanings or reasonings behind our concepts and behaviors. These people the Qur'an compares with the "lolling dog" (7:176) or cattle (7:179, 25:44, 47:12). The Qur'an really does expect Muslims to understand the deeper meanings, not just what lies on the surface.
December 17, 2010
Tintin and the Muslims
I was asked to comment about a blog post from June 2008 entitled "Europe" vs. "Western Civilization". The post is primarily a commentary about the Adam Tooze book, Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (with which I am not familiar), that has the unusual linkage of comparing Tooze's book to Hergé's comic book, Tintin in America (originally published in 1931). I will also admit to ignorance about Hergé's work, although I've tried to do a quick review about Hergé and the comic book in question.
The author of the blog post, "CPA," makes his primary argument in the following two paragraphs:
Now I bring up the stereotypes presented in the Tintin comic book because the specific request made of me was, "Do you have any thoughts regarding it [the blog post], perhaps on what it means on Muslim relations with America versus Muslim relations with mainland Europe?" Hergé's work seems somewhat similar in its "production values" (for want of a better term) to the current situation between Muslims in the United States and Europe.
In Wikipedia's article on the Tintin series (The Adventures of Tintin), it notes that Hergé did research on the people and countries to which Tintin traveled. However, one of the specific criticisms regarding Tintin in America is that "much of the sequence in the American West is less realistic, as it depicts the West as it was in the days of the Wild West, complete with cowboys and Indians", as opposed to the American west of the 1930s. (Much of the story takes place in Prohibition-era Chicago, with Al Capone being a character in the book.) So my thought is, what media was available to Hergé for his research at that time? Books, photographs and news accounts, certainly, but not much else. One wonders if the "cowboys and Indians" portion of the comic was influenced by Hollywood Westerns that had crossed the Atlantic into Europe in the 1920s and early 1930s. My point here is that with limited research materials, for Hergé and the rest of Europe at that time, was this a reason why there are the various European stereotypes of the United States as depicted in Tintin in America?
I would like to say that Muslim relations in America and Europe (indeed the rest of the world) follows along a similar vein, that the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims depends upon how well non-Muslims know Muslims, not just Muslim society in general but individual Muslims personally. (For North America and Southeast Asia, I think this theory works pretty well, but I'm not as convinced for Europe. More on that later.) If a non-Muslim knows a Muslim personally, he or she should (in theory) be less likely to demonize Islam and Muslim society. One would hope that a non-Muslim who personally knows a Muslim or Muslims won't think of Muslims in general as a dangerous "other," but that they are like Muhammad who works in the office or Yasmin who presents the news on TV.
In North America (and the U.S. in particular), I think that most non-Muslims are terribly ignorant about Islam and Muslim society, and that this ignorance has driven most of the fear and myth-making. (Myths about Islam including, "Muslims want to dominate the world," "Muslims want to impose Shari'ah on non-Muslims," and so on. That sort of nonsense.) Some of the problems facing the American Muslim community include the fact that Muslims make up a small (but growing) percentage of the total population, and that Muslims have been largely invisible to the American public for most of the country's history. I think Muslims only started coming into the American public's consciousness around 1973, when OPEC punished the U.S. for supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur War. Of course, since then, most reactions among Americans toward current events involving Muslims and Muslim countries have been negative (e.g., the Iranian Revolution and the Iran Hostage Crisis, hostages in Lebanon and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Israel/Palestine, Iraq before, during and after the two Gulf Wars, 9/11 and other terrorist attacks around the world, Afghanistan, etc.). Never mind the fact that the vast majority of Muslims in Western countries are peaceful, law-abiding citizens; never mind the fact that most non-Muslims don't recognize their own countries' actions as contributing to the Muslim world's problems. We're all innocent of any wrong-doing; don't you know? ("The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do." (p. 51 of Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations))
Another problem in America is simply that this type of behavior has a long history in the country. White Protestant culture has a difficult time accepting other people. The same problems Muslims face today have happened to the Blacks, Chinese, Hispanics, Jews, Gays, Catholics, and other groups, cultural, ethnic, religious, and so on. Racism and bigotry in America may have been tamped down in the 70s, 80s and 90s, but it never died out completely. It simmered on the back stove for several decades, and began to become unleashed once more in the 90s. Add to the fact that some Islamophobes have found fearmongering to be lucrative financially, and the lies began to be promoted much more strongly than in the past. The good news is that, in both the U.S. and Europe, people of good conscious have begun to fight back with the Muslims and other discriminated groups. Muslim projects such as the building of mosques in America have found supporters from non-Muslims.
In Southeast Asia, Islam has been a significant religion for centuries (roughly 900 years for Malaysia and 1,000 years for Indonesia). With majority populations in Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia, plus significant minority populations in the southern Philippines, Singapore and southern Thailand, most non-Muslims in this region are much better acquainted with Islam and Muslim culture than non-Muslims are in America and Europe. The problems that exist in the U.S. and Europe between Muslims and non-Muslims don't really exist in Southeast Asia. (Of course, there are other problems here between the two communities, but these issues don't seem to be as severe as in the West.) I think one of the key differences between America and Southeast Asia is that Asians are much more conducive toward tolerance between different groups. There are so many different ethnic and religious groups here that people are more willing to make a multicultural society work. (This is one of my complaints with Europeans who proclaim that multiculturalism doesn't work. Not true; it has and does in Asian cultures. Europeans just aren't trying hard enough.)
The question, then is, "Why aren't European non-Muslims more like Asians in their relations with Muslims? Why are they more like Americans?" On the one hand, you have a continent that is neighbors with the Muslim world and, in fact, has several distinct European Muslim communities within Europe itself (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia). Likewise, the absolute numbers and percentages of Muslims throughout Europe are much greater than they are in North America. For example, the Pew Foundation estimated that there are 38.1 million Muslims in Europe, comprising 5.2% of the total population, whereas the total number of Muslims in the Americas (North, Central and South America) totals 4.5 million, or 0.5% of the total population. (Pew estimates that there were 2.454 million Muslims in the U.S., or 0.8% of the population.) So, theoretically, there should be more interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims throughout Europe, even in countries with smaller Muslim populations, which should lead to less ignorance on the part of non-Muslims. But, based on my observations from afar, that doesn't seem to be the case.
Which makes me wonder, could any or all of the following be part of the problem: 1) Economic insecurity - Are worries over Muslim populations in Europe due to the same sort of worries regarding "Polish Plumbers?" In other words, that the cheaper labor coming from Muslim countries will take jobs away from Europeans of a lower socioeconomic level? 2) Racism - Are Europeans worried that Muslims represent a "browning" of the European gene pool similar to the miscegenation fears of Germans intermixing with Jews through World War 2 (or between blacks and whites in the U.S.)? 3) Socioeconomic status of Muslims (and non-Muslim Islamophobes) – One of the known differences between the American and European Muslim communities is that the American Muslims tend to be richer and perhaps more educated than European Muslims. This is due in part to American immigration policy, which, like many countries, encourages people with wealth, high levels of education (normally a minimum of a graduate degree), and/or vital-skill jobs (e.g., IT, medical, education, etc.) to move there. The immigrant Muslim community in the U.S. was able to move to America because they had these qualifications. European Muslims, on the other hand, aren’t necessarily as rich or well-educated; many families, of course, immigrated to European countries due to either post-WW2 labor shortages and/or relaxed immigration rules for countries that were once European colonies. This issue might tie in with the first issue mentioned above, economic insecurity. Perhaps the lower socioeconomic levels of Muslim immigrants in Europe are too similar to that of the native population, leading to the economic and/or xenophobic insecurities? (This issue is less of a problem in the U.S., where Islamophobia tends to be driven either by xenophobia or ideology (hatred of Islam as an ideology/religion).) 4) Tribalism in European society – I’ve read enough European history to know that, deep down, Europe is just as tribal as many other “tribal cultures.” (In today’s vernacular, most tribal conflicts are described as ethnic disputes between two or more groups, or international conflicts in which nations composed of different ethnicities clash over various issues.) I wonder if conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe might be considered a form of tribal conflict; for example, between the Germans and Turks living in Germany or the French and Muslims who come from the various North African countries?
(I claim no expertise regarding the European relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims; this is based solely upon what I've read on the Internet. If Muslim bloggers from or living in Europe wish to correct me on this section, I'd be happy for their input.)
* * *
John Espinoza brought up several good points in a recent essay at Huffington Post. On the one hand, he writes,
I agree with this, and perhaps this is a factor that should be considered for relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in America and Europe. (I don’t think a political/religious dichotomy is as apparent in Southeast Asia. Most people in this region, I think, recognize that tensions here are mostly political rather than religious in nature, even when the personalities involved are deeply religious.) I’m not able to judge how well the European non-Muslim population views their conflicts with Muslims between politics and religion; however, I do think that most Americans view conflicts with Muslims as being religious in nature instead of political. (This is ironic considering that the far right in the U.S. has begun to argue, fallaciously, that Islam is not a religion but a political ideology.) In fact, I would even go so far as to say that many Americans find it difficult to distinguish the political context for many conflicts. If a conflict involves groups with different religions, Americans will tend to define the conflict in terms of the religions involved instead of the political factions. This happens often with "Muslims vs. ..." whomever (Jews, Christians, Hindus, etc.), but also with conflicts that don't involve any Muslims (Northern Ireland in particular). The problem, of course, is that while religious beliefs may play a part in the conflict, other factors are often involved that have nothing to do with religion (e.g., conflicts between ethnic groups, calls for self-determination, control of natural resources, economic inequalities, etc.).
Esposito provides potential solutions that Muslims offer to help improve relations with non-Muslims:
The problem is, I doubt that even these simple solutions can be performed by non-Muslim society. There is just too much profit (figuratively and literally, as I mentioned above) to be gained from not improving relations between non-Muslims and Muslims.
Update: Quarkstomper wrote a very good comment over at Street Prophets, where I had cross-posted this diary, regarding Hergé and his research:
Update #2: Quarkstomper has expanded upon his comment, and has written the diary Hergé and Tintin, which gives a brief biography of the cartoonist and the cartoon strip. I've also cross-posted this essay over at Daily Kos (glutton for punishment that I am ;) ).
The author of the blog post, "CPA," makes his primary argument in the following two paragraphs:
After reading Tooze's book, the answer I think is pretty plain: Nazism wasn't just about racism, it was also about Europeanism. In other words it was not just about making "Aryans" triumph over Jews, Roma, and other inferior races in Europe, it was also about making Europe as a continent triumph over rival continents. And by rival continents, the only one really in question was North America. One could even go so far as to say that the racism was instrumental to the "continentism"; that grinding inferior races in Europe into the dust was only a means to the end of keeping Europe the world's leading continent. What is so striking about this is how geography trumped race even in the strategy of the most justly notorious racists in history. How could this be?
Here is where Tintin in America comes in. To understand European fear of North America, one needs to understand the European image of America. Tintin's America is a gangster paradise, a land of skyscrapers and anarchy, of grotesque slaughterhouses and industrialized food, drunken sheriffs enforcing Prohibition while citizens have fun at a lynching parties, a land where oil companies routinely dispossess Indians, where you can go to sleep in a prairie one day and wake up in a traffic-jammed metropolis the next. Now, this is Tintin, and it is all fairly light-hearted. ... As Tintin leaves on a steamer back for Europe, he sighs, "Funny, and I was just starting to like the place." But make no mistake, America is not part of some "Western civilization" -- it is just as alien to Herge's European readers as Africa, the Soviet Union, or the Arab world and India, scenes for his immediately preceding and following Tintin volumes.
Now I bring up the stereotypes presented in the Tintin comic book because the specific request made of me was, "Do you have any thoughts regarding it [the blog post], perhaps on what it means on Muslim relations with America versus Muslim relations with mainland Europe?" Hergé's work seems somewhat similar in its "production values" (for want of a better term) to the current situation between Muslims in the United States and Europe.
In Wikipedia's article on the Tintin series (The Adventures of Tintin), it notes that Hergé did research on the people and countries to which Tintin traveled. However, one of the specific criticisms regarding Tintin in America is that "much of the sequence in the American West is less realistic, as it depicts the West as it was in the days of the Wild West, complete with cowboys and Indians", as opposed to the American west of the 1930s. (Much of the story takes place in Prohibition-era Chicago, with Al Capone being a character in the book.) So my thought is, what media was available to Hergé for his research at that time? Books, photographs and news accounts, certainly, but not much else. One wonders if the "cowboys and Indians" portion of the comic was influenced by Hollywood Westerns that had crossed the Atlantic into Europe in the 1920s and early 1930s. My point here is that with limited research materials, for Hergé and the rest of Europe at that time, was this a reason why there are the various European stereotypes of the United States as depicted in Tintin in America?
I would like to say that Muslim relations in America and Europe (indeed the rest of the world) follows along a similar vein, that the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims depends upon how well non-Muslims know Muslims, not just Muslim society in general but individual Muslims personally. (For North America and Southeast Asia, I think this theory works pretty well, but I'm not as convinced for Europe. More on that later.) If a non-Muslim knows a Muslim personally, he or she should (in theory) be less likely to demonize Islam and Muslim society. One would hope that a non-Muslim who personally knows a Muslim or Muslims won't think of Muslims in general as a dangerous "other," but that they are like Muhammad who works in the office or Yasmin who presents the news on TV.
In North America (and the U.S. in particular), I think that most non-Muslims are terribly ignorant about Islam and Muslim society, and that this ignorance has driven most of the fear and myth-making. (Myths about Islam including, "Muslims want to dominate the world," "Muslims want to impose Shari'ah on non-Muslims," and so on. That sort of nonsense.) Some of the problems facing the American Muslim community include the fact that Muslims make up a small (but growing) percentage of the total population, and that Muslims have been largely invisible to the American public for most of the country's history. I think Muslims only started coming into the American public's consciousness around 1973, when OPEC punished the U.S. for supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur War. Of course, since then, most reactions among Americans toward current events involving Muslims and Muslim countries have been negative (e.g., the Iranian Revolution and the Iran Hostage Crisis, hostages in Lebanon and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Israel/Palestine, Iraq before, during and after the two Gulf Wars, 9/11 and other terrorist attacks around the world, Afghanistan, etc.). Never mind the fact that the vast majority of Muslims in Western countries are peaceful, law-abiding citizens; never mind the fact that most non-Muslims don't recognize their own countries' actions as contributing to the Muslim world's problems. We're all innocent of any wrong-doing; don't you know? ("The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do." (p. 51 of Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations))
Another problem in America is simply that this type of behavior has a long history in the country. White Protestant culture has a difficult time accepting other people. The same problems Muslims face today have happened to the Blacks, Chinese, Hispanics, Jews, Gays, Catholics, and other groups, cultural, ethnic, religious, and so on. Racism and bigotry in America may have been tamped down in the 70s, 80s and 90s, but it never died out completely. It simmered on the back stove for several decades, and began to become unleashed once more in the 90s. Add to the fact that some Islamophobes have found fearmongering to be lucrative financially, and the lies began to be promoted much more strongly than in the past. The good news is that, in both the U.S. and Europe, people of good conscious have begun to fight back with the Muslims and other discriminated groups. Muslim projects such as the building of mosques in America have found supporters from non-Muslims.
In Southeast Asia, Islam has been a significant religion for centuries (roughly 900 years for Malaysia and 1,000 years for Indonesia). With majority populations in Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia, plus significant minority populations in the southern Philippines, Singapore and southern Thailand, most non-Muslims in this region are much better acquainted with Islam and Muslim culture than non-Muslims are in America and Europe. The problems that exist in the U.S. and Europe between Muslims and non-Muslims don't really exist in Southeast Asia. (Of course, there are other problems here between the two communities, but these issues don't seem to be as severe as in the West.) I think one of the key differences between America and Southeast Asia is that Asians are much more conducive toward tolerance between different groups. There are so many different ethnic and religious groups here that people are more willing to make a multicultural society work. (This is one of my complaints with Europeans who proclaim that multiculturalism doesn't work. Not true; it has and does in Asian cultures. Europeans just aren't trying hard enough.)
The question, then is, "Why aren't European non-Muslims more like Asians in their relations with Muslims? Why are they more like Americans?" On the one hand, you have a continent that is neighbors with the Muslim world and, in fact, has several distinct European Muslim communities within Europe itself (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia). Likewise, the absolute numbers and percentages of Muslims throughout Europe are much greater than they are in North America. For example, the Pew Foundation estimated that there are 38.1 million Muslims in Europe, comprising 5.2% of the total population, whereas the total number of Muslims in the Americas (North, Central and South America) totals 4.5 million, or 0.5% of the total population. (Pew estimates that there were 2.454 million Muslims in the U.S., or 0.8% of the population.) So, theoretically, there should be more interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims throughout Europe, even in countries with smaller Muslim populations, which should lead to less ignorance on the part of non-Muslims. But, based on my observations from afar, that doesn't seem to be the case.
Which makes me wonder, could any or all of the following be part of the problem: 1) Economic insecurity - Are worries over Muslim populations in Europe due to the same sort of worries regarding "Polish Plumbers?" In other words, that the cheaper labor coming from Muslim countries will take jobs away from Europeans of a lower socioeconomic level? 2) Racism - Are Europeans worried that Muslims represent a "browning" of the European gene pool similar to the miscegenation fears of Germans intermixing with Jews through World War 2 (or between blacks and whites in the U.S.)? 3) Socioeconomic status of Muslims (and non-Muslim Islamophobes) – One of the known differences between the American and European Muslim communities is that the American Muslims tend to be richer and perhaps more educated than European Muslims. This is due in part to American immigration policy, which, like many countries, encourages people with wealth, high levels of education (normally a minimum of a graduate degree), and/or vital-skill jobs (e.g., IT, medical, education, etc.) to move there. The immigrant Muslim community in the U.S. was able to move to America because they had these qualifications. European Muslims, on the other hand, aren’t necessarily as rich or well-educated; many families, of course, immigrated to European countries due to either post-WW2 labor shortages and/or relaxed immigration rules for countries that were once European colonies. This issue might tie in with the first issue mentioned above, economic insecurity. Perhaps the lower socioeconomic levels of Muslim immigrants in Europe are too similar to that of the native population, leading to the economic and/or xenophobic insecurities? (This issue is less of a problem in the U.S., where Islamophobia tends to be driven either by xenophobia or ideology (hatred of Islam as an ideology/religion).) 4) Tribalism in European society – I’ve read enough European history to know that, deep down, Europe is just as tribal as many other “tribal cultures.” (In today’s vernacular, most tribal conflicts are described as ethnic disputes between two or more groups, or international conflicts in which nations composed of different ethnicities clash over various issues.) I wonder if conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe might be considered a form of tribal conflict; for example, between the Germans and Turks living in Germany or the French and Muslims who come from the various North African countries?
(I claim no expertise regarding the European relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims; this is based solely upon what I've read on the Internet. If Muslim bloggers from or living in Europe wish to correct me on this section, I'd be happy for their input.)
John Espinoza brought up several good points in a recent essay at Huffington Post. On the one hand, he writes,
…those that think the root cause of Muslim-West tensions is political are more likely to see it as avoidable. Those who see it as religious are more likely to believe it as unavoidable. Therefore, if the conflict is framed as "political," people are more likely to work to find a solution.
I agree with this, and perhaps this is a factor that should be considered for relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in America and Europe. (I don’t think a political/religious dichotomy is as apparent in Southeast Asia. Most people in this region, I think, recognize that tensions here are mostly political rather than religious in nature, even when the personalities involved are deeply religious.) I’m not able to judge how well the European non-Muslim population views their conflicts with Muslims between politics and religion; however, I do think that most Americans view conflicts with Muslims as being religious in nature instead of political. (This is ironic considering that the far right in the U.S. has begun to argue, fallaciously, that Islam is not a religion but a political ideology.) In fact, I would even go so far as to say that many Americans find it difficult to distinguish the political context for many conflicts. If a conflict involves groups with different religions, Americans will tend to define the conflict in terms of the religions involved instead of the political factions. This happens often with "Muslims vs. ..." whomever (Jews, Christians, Hindus, etc.), but also with conflicts that don't involve any Muslims (Northern Ireland in particular). The problem, of course, is that while religious beliefs may play a part in the conflict, other factors are often involved that have nothing to do with religion (e.g., conflicts between ethnic groups, calls for self-determination, control of natural resources, economic inequalities, etc.).
Esposito provides potential solutions that Muslims offer to help improve relations with non-Muslims:
Majorities of Muslims expressed their deep concerns about this lack of respect but they also offered positive solutions: stop desecrating the Quran and religious symbols, treat Muslims fairly in the politics that affect them and portray Muslim characters accurately in popular media.
The problem is, I doubt that even these simple solutions can be performed by non-Muslim society. There is just too much profit (figuratively and literally, as I mentioned above) to be gained from not improving relations between non-Muslims and Muslims.
Update: Quarkstomper wrote a very good comment over at Street Prophets, where I had cross-posted this diary, regarding Hergé and his research:
Hergé did a great deal of research for his later Tintin stories, but not at the beginning. His first one, Tintin in the Land of the Soviets, was based on material from a book about the Soviet Union that his editor gave him. (The paper Tintin originally appeared in was a Catholic one with a strong conservative and anti-communist slant). His second one, Tintin in the Congo, was likewise written at his editor's request and was an embarrassing pro-colonial apology. After that, Hergé was permitted to write pretty much what he wanted, which was to take Tintin to exotic places that captured his imagination. Like America.
After Tintin in America and The Cigars of the Pharaohs (taking place in Egypt and India), Hergé announced that he would next take Tintin to China. He received a letter from a Roman Catholic priest asking him to please take care to portray the country accurately. The priest introduced him to a young Chinese student from his school named Chang. The young man became Hergé's assistant for the next story, The Blue Lotus, and provided him not only with factual information and calligraphy, but also a bit of cultural understanding. The Blue Lotus gave a much more sympathetic view of China and the Chinese people than was common in western media at the time.
After The Blue Lotus, Hergé took the lesson about research to heart, and his later adventures were all meticulously researched.
Update #2: Quarkstomper has expanded upon his comment, and has written the diary Hergé and Tintin, which gives a brief biography of the cartoonist and the cartoon strip. I've also cross-posted this essay over at Daily Kos (glutton for punishment that I am ;) ).
August 28, 2010
One Day in Ramadan
Earlier this month, I had been asked to provide an insider's perspective on Ramadan. That person had written:
This diary tries to present a small glimpse into the Ramadan experience.
4:30 a.m. - The alarm goes off to wake my wife and I up to start the new day. We eat some breakfast, take our respective sets of pills, then brush our teeth. The break of dawn doesn't begin until 5:45, but we stop all eating and drinking ten minutes earlier to make sure that, by 5:45, any remaining food or liquid in our mouths will have been swallowed.
This is my eleventh Ramadan; the first time I fasted for Ramadan was back in 2000. I had reverted to Islam only a few months earlier so, when I approached some friends at the mosque and asked them how I should prepare for fasting, they correctly advised me, "You don't." There is no correct way to prepare for fasting; you just plunge ahead and do it. The first four days of my fast were excruciatingly painful. My stomach had never gone through a full day without any food. On the fifth day, my stomach started to understand that there was not going to be any meals until supper, so the hunger pains began to let up. However, I still dealt with the issue of thirst, especially for the next nine days or so, when I ultimately discovered that the best thing to do was to keep my mouth shut, literally. Talk as little as possible (not always possible for a teacher), and breathe primarily through my nose. After that, fasting became easier. That first year, I lost a lot of weight, forcing me to buy a new, smaller belt during the middle of the month.
Fasting is about depriving one's self of some of the basic physiological necessities of life. But when one doesn't feel any hunger pangs or thirstiness during Ramadan, as I rarely do anymore, other issues come to the forefront. In recent years, I have begun to notice "themes" during Ramadan, spiritual lessons regarding different subjects that have tied into Ramadan. Ramadan is a time when there is an emphasis on feeling empathy for those who are less fortunate than ourselves. In the last few years I had had some relatively minor health issues to deal with during Ramadan (severe head aches toward the end of the day, and sticky mucus at the back of my sinuses that gave me some difficulty in breathing early in the morning). These discomforts have reminded me of those people who have little or no access to health care, something that perhaps some people take for granted, but an issue that can become the focal point of other people's lives. This year's theme has centered around family, as I suspected it would. With the sudden passing of my father-in-law earlier this year, my wife's family has worked to give more emotional support to some of the family members who have taken the loss of "Abah" the hardest.
One aspect about Ramadan that many non-Muslims don't grasp is the close connection there is between fasting and zakat, the giving of charity, which is another pillar of Islam. The two are closely connected in that both are about purification. Fasting helps to purify the body, while zakat helps to purify one's wealth. In Islam, income and wealth need to be "pure," meaning that the source or manner in which the wealth and income has been obtained must be halal. Muslims often work through moral quandaries in deciding whether to take certain jobs: Can she work as a cashier when the grocery store sells pork and alcohol? Can he work in a hotel that is attached to a casino? Can she become a teller at a bank that relies upon interest for its primary source of revenue? To help purify that money, Muslims donate some of their personal wealth each year to help the poor.* In Singapore, it is not uncommon to see people or even businesses donating food to the poor as part of their effort to give charity. (The most common food given away here is rice porridge with chicken; however, one year, I walked through a shopping center where a business was about to give out fried chickens to a long queue of people who were waiting to take some home for their dinner that night. That was one of the few times recently where I grew hungry during the day - the smell of all that chicken was very strong.)
In many countries with significant Muslim populations, the month of Ramadan has become commercialized although, at least here in Singapore, that degree of commercialization is nowhere near the level of the American Christmas season. Some countries increase the number of cooking shows and "crazy soap operas" on television (as an Internet friend living in the UAE put it). In Singapore, the commercial side of Ramadan means shopping in the Malay Village section of Geylang and Sims Roads. The difference between the Christmas and Ramadan shopping seasons, though, is that Muslim shoppers aren't necessarily looking for gifts to give. In Singapore, at least, gifts are only given to children during the Eid festivities, and the gifts are almost always some money. (I was shocked when, last year, my wife's grandmother gave me a gift of money for Eid; money, if it is given to adults, is almost always for older relatives, like parents, aunts and uncles, and grandparents, who may be living on fixed incomes.) Instead, Muslim shoppers normally buy merchandise to prepare their families and their homes for Eid. Thus, apparel like color-coordinated Baju Melayus for men and Baju Kurungs for women, home furnishings (curtains, cushion covers, rugs, etc.), and all sorts of traditional cookies are some of the most popular items sold at the Ramadan markets.
But ultimately, Ramadan is a religious observance, in which mosques become a little more crowded for all of the prayers other than the Friday noon congregational prayer (which remains consistently full year-round). In Singapore, evening tarawih prayers are often conducted at housing block void decks because there is not enough space in the mosques to accommodate everyone who wishes to perform them. Religious talks are often given publicly, some of which are broadcast on television, as well as Qur'an recital competitions. The hope of every Muslim during Ramadan is that each of their daily fasts are accepted by Allah (swt), in addition to all of the good deeds that they may have performed.
7:12 p.m. - I had actually fallen asleep on the bed late in the afternoon when my wife rushed into the bedroom. "Wake up! The adhan is playing!" she said as she handed me a glass of Coke Zero (not the traditional drink to break one's fast with ;) ). I swallowed a little bit of the pop while giving a prayer of thanks for having made it through another day in Ramadan. A few minutes later, my wife and I ate our dinner for the evening.
* The percentage varies depending upon the type of asset that is "zakatable," but for most Muslims who live in cities, the percentage tends to be 2.5%. Also, various assets are subject to zakat, while others are not, such as family homes. The calculations to determine zakat can become rather complex, depending upon what the person owns. BTW, zakat is a wealth tax, not an income tax.
Update: I am pleased to say that this essay has received some recognition on a few major websites. On Street Prophets, where it was originally published, the essay was immediately promoted to the Front Page. On Daily Kos, the essay was one out of only seven diaries "rescued" by the DKos volunteers. (Rescued diaries, for those who don't know, are those diaries that did not make the "Recommended List" but are deemed an overlooked "must read" essay; at DKos, it's a very high honor to have one's diary rescued as it too is mentioned on the Front Page.)
I would like to know more about Ramadan ... I mean I could look it up in Wikipedia ... However, I would like to know not only about the event itself, but the event and the event [sic] from a more personal view.
This diary tries to present a small glimpse into the Ramadan experience.
4:30 a.m. - The alarm goes off to wake my wife and I up to start the new day. We eat some breakfast, take our respective sets of pills, then brush our teeth. The break of dawn doesn't begin until 5:45, but we stop all eating and drinking ten minutes earlier to make sure that, by 5:45, any remaining food or liquid in our mouths will have been swallowed.
This is my eleventh Ramadan; the first time I fasted for Ramadan was back in 2000. I had reverted to Islam only a few months earlier so, when I approached some friends at the mosque and asked them how I should prepare for fasting, they correctly advised me, "You don't." There is no correct way to prepare for fasting; you just plunge ahead and do it. The first four days of my fast were excruciatingly painful. My stomach had never gone through a full day without any food. On the fifth day, my stomach started to understand that there was not going to be any meals until supper, so the hunger pains began to let up. However, I still dealt with the issue of thirst, especially for the next nine days or so, when I ultimately discovered that the best thing to do was to keep my mouth shut, literally. Talk as little as possible (not always possible for a teacher), and breathe primarily through my nose. After that, fasting became easier. That first year, I lost a lot of weight, forcing me to buy a new, smaller belt during the middle of the month.
Fasting is about depriving one's self of some of the basic physiological necessities of life. But when one doesn't feel any hunger pangs or thirstiness during Ramadan, as I rarely do anymore, other issues come to the forefront. In recent years, I have begun to notice "themes" during Ramadan, spiritual lessons regarding different subjects that have tied into Ramadan. Ramadan is a time when there is an emphasis on feeling empathy for those who are less fortunate than ourselves. In the last few years I had had some relatively minor health issues to deal with during Ramadan (severe head aches toward the end of the day, and sticky mucus at the back of my sinuses that gave me some difficulty in breathing early in the morning). These discomforts have reminded me of those people who have little or no access to health care, something that perhaps some people take for granted, but an issue that can become the focal point of other people's lives. This year's theme has centered around family, as I suspected it would. With the sudden passing of my father-in-law earlier this year, my wife's family has worked to give more emotional support to some of the family members who have taken the loss of "Abah" the hardest.
One aspect about Ramadan that many non-Muslims don't grasp is the close connection there is between fasting and zakat, the giving of charity, which is another pillar of Islam. The two are closely connected in that both are about purification. Fasting helps to purify the body, while zakat helps to purify one's wealth. In Islam, income and wealth need to be "pure," meaning that the source or manner in which the wealth and income has been obtained must be halal. Muslims often work through moral quandaries in deciding whether to take certain jobs: Can she work as a cashier when the grocery store sells pork and alcohol? Can he work in a hotel that is attached to a casino? Can she become a teller at a bank that relies upon interest for its primary source of revenue? To help purify that money, Muslims donate some of their personal wealth each year to help the poor.* In Singapore, it is not uncommon to see people or even businesses donating food to the poor as part of their effort to give charity. (The most common food given away here is rice porridge with chicken; however, one year, I walked through a shopping center where a business was about to give out fried chickens to a long queue of people who were waiting to take some home for their dinner that night. That was one of the few times recently where I grew hungry during the day - the smell of all that chicken was very strong.)
In many countries with significant Muslim populations, the month of Ramadan has become commercialized although, at least here in Singapore, that degree of commercialization is nowhere near the level of the American Christmas season. Some countries increase the number of cooking shows and "crazy soap operas" on television (as an Internet friend living in the UAE put it). In Singapore, the commercial side of Ramadan means shopping in the Malay Village section of Geylang and Sims Roads. The difference between the Christmas and Ramadan shopping seasons, though, is that Muslim shoppers aren't necessarily looking for gifts to give. In Singapore, at least, gifts are only given to children during the Eid festivities, and the gifts are almost always some money. (I was shocked when, last year, my wife's grandmother gave me a gift of money for Eid; money, if it is given to adults, is almost always for older relatives, like parents, aunts and uncles, and grandparents, who may be living on fixed incomes.) Instead, Muslim shoppers normally buy merchandise to prepare their families and their homes for Eid. Thus, apparel like color-coordinated Baju Melayus for men and Baju Kurungs for women, home furnishings (curtains, cushion covers, rugs, etc.), and all sorts of traditional cookies are some of the most popular items sold at the Ramadan markets.
But ultimately, Ramadan is a religious observance, in which mosques become a little more crowded for all of the prayers other than the Friday noon congregational prayer (which remains consistently full year-round). In Singapore, evening tarawih prayers are often conducted at housing block void decks because there is not enough space in the mosques to accommodate everyone who wishes to perform them. Religious talks are often given publicly, some of which are broadcast on television, as well as Qur'an recital competitions. The hope of every Muslim during Ramadan is that each of their daily fasts are accepted by Allah (swt), in addition to all of the good deeds that they may have performed.
7:12 p.m. - I had actually fallen asleep on the bed late in the afternoon when my wife rushed into the bedroom. "Wake up! The adhan is playing!" she said as she handed me a glass of Coke Zero (not the traditional drink to break one's fast with ;) ). I swallowed a little bit of the pop while giving a prayer of thanks for having made it through another day in Ramadan. A few minutes later, my wife and I ate our dinner for the evening.
* The percentage varies depending upon the type of asset that is "zakatable," but for most Muslims who live in cities, the percentage tends to be 2.5%. Also, various assets are subject to zakat, while others are not, such as family homes. The calculations to determine zakat can become rather complex, depending upon what the person owns. BTW, zakat is a wealth tax, not an income tax.
Update: I am pleased to say that this essay has received some recognition on a few major websites. On Street Prophets, where it was originally published, the essay was immediately promoted to the Front Page. On Daily Kos, the essay was one out of only seven diaries "rescued" by the DKos volunteers. (Rescued diaries, for those who don't know, are those diaries that did not make the "Recommended List" but are deemed an overlooked "must read" essay; at DKos, it's a very high honor to have one's diary rescued as it too is mentioned on the Front Page.)
August 21, 2010
Mosques and Suraus
There has been some discussion on the Internet regarding the Park 51 community center (aka the "Ground Zero Mosque") as to whether the prayer space in the community center will be a mosque or not. This question has devolved into one even more basic: what is the difference between a mosque and a prayer space, such as one might find in a building that is not considered to be a mosque? This is my answer:
The distinction is somewhat hazy, but there is some distinction between mosques and other places in which we Muslims pray. Generally speaking, mosques are capable of holding more than 40 people (the minimum number of Muslims required for jumu'ah, the Friday congregational prayers), have a mihrab (the central niche that points the direction toward Makkah) and minbar (the pulpit from which the sermon is spoken from during jumu'ah), and normally performs all prayers with an imam present, including jumu'ah.
Here in SE Asia, we call a non-mosque facility a surau. A surau differs from a mosque in that it usually cannot fit 40 or more people in the facility*, may or may not have a mihrab, never has a minbar, and has no imams attached to the facility. They are used only for individual prayers and never for congregational prayers. (If two or more people happen to be at the surau at the same time, they may choose to pray together, but that's not considered congregational prayer.)
The Park51 facility may or may not be a mosque; it would at the very least be a surau. The key question from a Muslim perspective is, will jumu'ah be done there with the imam physically present? If yes, then it would be a mosque; if no, then it's only a surau.
* I've used several suraus over the years, the smallest of which was located in an Ikea store here in Singapore. That surau was big enough to fit in four people praying together at the absolute maximum.
The distinction is somewhat hazy, but there is some distinction between mosques and other places in which we Muslims pray. Generally speaking, mosques are capable of holding more than 40 people (the minimum number of Muslims required for jumu'ah, the Friday congregational prayers), have a mihrab (the central niche that points the direction toward Makkah) and minbar (the pulpit from which the sermon is spoken from during jumu'ah), and normally performs all prayers with an imam present, including jumu'ah.
Here in SE Asia, we call a non-mosque facility a surau. A surau differs from a mosque in that it usually cannot fit 40 or more people in the facility*, may or may not have a mihrab, never has a minbar, and has no imams attached to the facility. They are used only for individual prayers and never for congregational prayers. (If two or more people happen to be at the surau at the same time, they may choose to pray together, but that's not considered congregational prayer.)
The Park51 facility may or may not be a mosque; it would at the very least be a surau. The key question from a Muslim perspective is, will jumu'ah be done there with the imam physically present? If yes, then it would be a mosque; if no, then it's only a surau.
* I've used several suraus over the years, the smallest of which was located in an Ikea store here in Singapore. That surau was big enough to fit in four people praying together at the absolute maximum.
August 18, 2010
The False Hope for "Reform Islam"
I came across a recent comment in which a person at Street Prophets wrote about their hope for a "reform" Islam that would be on a par with reform Judaism. the following is my response to that comment:
I hate to break this to you, but there will be no "reform" Islam anytime in the foreseeable future, insha'allah. The so-called "progressive" Muslim movement reached its peak in the early 2000s before self-imploding; their leaders were too full of ego to be able to work with each other, and they were never taken seriously (in fact, completely rejected by) the orthodox Muslim community. No group has ever taken their place, and they have no significant web presence.
A few weeks ago, in a report by the Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre (Jordan), entitled "The 500 Most Influential Muslims - 2010," the authors broke down the worldwide Muslim population by both doctrine and ideology. The ideological divisions are as follows: Traditional Islam, Islamic Fundamentalism, and Islamic Modernism. The authors described Islamic Modernism as follows:
Of the three groups, Islamic Modernists make up the smallest percentage worldwide, at 1%. Traditional Islam come in at 96%, and Islamic Fundamentalists at 3%. (The Sufis, called "Mystic Brotherhoods" in the report, are classified (correctly) under Traditional Islam.) The Modernists have no standing to influence the Muslim community, whether in the US or any other country.
If you want to encourage the positive aspects of Islam, you must deal with orthodox Muslims. This is not simply a case of conceit or real politik, it is simple fact as verified through academic studies. A recent study (January 2010) by researchers at Duke University and the University of North Carolina (Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans [pdf]) found that, rather than increasing radicalization, mosque membership actually helped to reduce radicalization by working on community building. Moreover, that
Likewise, a 2008 study published by the Harvard Kennedy School (Estimating the Impact of the Hajj: Religion and Tolerance in Islam's Global Gathering ) found that:
So don't waste your time pining away for "reform" Islam; it is we orthodox Muslims whom you must talk with.
I hate to break this to you, but there will be no "reform" Islam anytime in the foreseeable future, insha'allah. The so-called "progressive" Muslim movement reached its peak in the early 2000s before self-imploding; their leaders were too full of ego to be able to work with each other, and they were never taken seriously (in fact, completely rejected by) the orthodox Muslim community. No group has ever taken their place, and they have no significant web presence.
A few weeks ago, in a report by the Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre (Jordan), entitled "The 500 Most Influential Muslims - 2010," the authors broke down the worldwide Muslim population by both doctrine and ideology. The ideological divisions are as follows: Traditional Islam, Islamic Fundamentalism, and Islamic Modernism. The authors described Islamic Modernism as follows:
Islamic modernism is a reform movement started by politically-minded urbanites with scant knowledge of traditional Islam. These people had witnessed and studied Western technology and socio-political ideas, and realized that the Islamic world was being left behind technologically by the West and had become too weak to stand up to it. They blamed this weakness on what they saw as ‘traditional Islam,’ which they thought held them back and was not ‘progressive’ enough. They thus called for a complete overhaul of Islam, including — or rather in particular — Islamic law (sharia) and doctrine (aqida). Islamic modernism remains popularly an object of derision and ridicule, and is scorned by traditional Muslims and fundamentalists alike.
Of the three groups, Islamic Modernists make up the smallest percentage worldwide, at 1%. Traditional Islam come in at 96%, and Islamic Fundamentalists at 3%. (The Sufis, called "Mystic Brotherhoods" in the report, are classified (correctly) under Traditional Islam.) The Modernists have no standing to influence the Muslim community, whether in the US or any other country.
If you want to encourage the positive aspects of Islam, you must deal with orthodox Muslims. This is not simply a case of conceit or real politik, it is simple fact as verified through academic studies. A recent study (January 2010) by researchers at Duke University and the University of North Carolina (Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans [pdf]) found that, rather than increasing radicalization, mosque membership actually helped to reduce radicalization by working on community building. Moreover, that
"This research reinforces the generally accepted observation that Muslim-Americans with a strong, traditional religious training are far less likely to radicalize than those without such training."
Likewise, a 2008 study published by the Harvard Kennedy School (Estimating the Impact of the Hajj: Religion and Tolerance in Islam's Global Gathering ) found that:
...participation in the Hajj increases observance of global Islamic practices such as prayer and fasting while decreasing participation in localized practices and beliefs such as the use of amulets and dowry. It increases belief in equality and harmony among ethnic groups and Islamic sects and leads to more favorable attitudes toward women, including greater acceptance of female education and employment. Increased unity within the Islamic world is not accompanied by antipathy toward non-Muslims. Instead, Hajjis show increased belief in peace, and in equality and harmony among adherents of different religions.
So don't waste your time pining away for "reform" Islam; it is we orthodox Muslims whom you must talk with.
August 13, 2010
July 30, 2010
Response to George
Would reducing or eliminating America's dependence on foreign oil undercut the economic basis of Islamophobia?
It might to a degree, but not nearly to the extent that it might have if this was the mid 70s. Although I was only a teenager at the time, the mid 70s seemed to be the main era when Islamophobia was based largely on economics. The trigger event was the oil crisis of '73-'74, which awakened the Western public to both their oil dependence and the fact that Middle Eastern society (in particular) was being built upon petrodollars. This awakening brought about a number of articles that I remember reading which tended to be anti-Arab, anti-Islam. One cartoon I remember from that era showed an Arab sheikh in his thobe and kaffiyah standing on the rim of the Grand Canyon and being told by a man in a business suit behind him that "It's not for sale." (This reminds me of the late 80s, when Japanese businesses began buying up a lot of American businesses and properties, with a resultant backlash against the Japanese at that time; Michael Crichton cashed in on that xenophobia with his book (and movie), Rising Sun.)
But since the mid 70s I'd say that the economic basis for Islamophobia has dwindled fairly dramatically. American Islamophobia today tends to be rooted in a lot of other, non-economic factors (e.g., terrorist acts committed by Muslims, American military misadventures in the Middle East (Lebanon, Iraq) and Central Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan), the Iranian hostage crisis and the dysfunctional diplomatic relationship between the US and Iran ever since, America's blind support for Israel, and the rise of a more visible, more active Muslim community, both in the U.S. and worldwide, that scares American non-Muslims both politically and religiously).
As for foreign oil, as of two years ago (June 2008, when I last wrote about this), five of the top ten countries the U.S. imported oil from were non-Muslim: Canada (who was the #1 seller of crude oil to the US at the time), Mexico, Venezuela, Angola and Ecuador). The first three of those countries provided over 44% of all the U.S.'s imported crude oil. So the U.S. is not quite as dependent upon oil from Muslim countries as perhaps they were in the past.
Personally, I don't think that, even if the U.S. didn't buy a single drop of crude oil from a Muslim country, that would stop all the Islamophobia in the U.S. Many Americans simply can't live without having someone else to hate. Some Muslims haven't helped the American (and worldwide) Muslim community with their actions, but Muslims aren't the only group currently being vilified in the U.S. at the moment. The Hispanics can attest to that.
Labels:
Afghanistan,
Angola,
Arabs,
Canada,
Ecuador,
Energy,
Iran,
Iraq,
Islamophobia,
Israel,
Lebanon,
Mexico,
Middle East,
Muslims,
Oil,
Pakistan,
Venezuela,
Xenophobia
July 27, 2010
Are Muslims Organized to Resist Bigotry?
There was an interesting comment over at Daily Kos on a diary that discussed the Cordoba House community center and mosque (the so-called "Ground Zero Mosque"). Here is the original comment:
And this is my response:
It's not that Muslims aren't organized to resist bigotry or that we don't realize the importance of political engagement. On the contrary, there are several organizations that engage in both of these aspects every day, including CAIR and MAS among others. Could these organizations do a better job than they are now? I'm sure they would say "yes," along with a request for more manpower and money.
But let's be realistic here: the real issue is not the Muslim community's level of organization vis-a-vis bigotry, it's the level of bigotry among non-Muslims. And the real problem there is that these types of attitudes, once set, rarely change. There are a number of Islamophobes here at Kos who one might think would change their opinions and attitudes toward Islam and Muslims after participating in so many discussions on these topics, but I have yet to see any evidence that those attitudes have changed at all. They have had the opportunity to learn about Islam and the Muslim world, they have discussed Islam and the Muslim world with a number of different Muslims here at Kos, but there is no change. They continue to sputter in their rage against Islam.
If the 2008 presidential campaign and the Obama presidency have shown anything, it is that racism never died out. The success of the civil rights movement may have caused racists to lower their profile in the 70s and 80s, but their attitudes never went away. They were the true sleeper cells within American society. Muslims have been doing their part to resist bigotry and to organize politically, but I don't ever expect Islamophobia to ever go away in American society. For that to happen, American would need to revert en masse to Islam. Not that that couldn't happen; it's done so with a number of different cultures before, but I'm not holding my breath until that time.
I wish Muslims were organized to resist bigotry
I don't think they realized the importance of political engagement or are simply unprepared to deal with this level of discrimination that came after 9/11. It is time they learned from the civil rights movements and get very active. The fact this bigotry is tolerated demonstrates how much bigotry our media is willing to propagate at the expense of those who don't loudly resist.
And this is my response:
It's not that Muslims aren't organized to resist bigotry or that we don't realize the importance of political engagement. On the contrary, there are several organizations that engage in both of these aspects every day, including CAIR and MAS among others. Could these organizations do a better job than they are now? I'm sure they would say "yes," along with a request for more manpower and money.
But let's be realistic here: the real issue is not the Muslim community's level of organization vis-a-vis bigotry, it's the level of bigotry among non-Muslims. And the real problem there is that these types of attitudes, once set, rarely change. There are a number of Islamophobes here at Kos who one might think would change their opinions and attitudes toward Islam and Muslims after participating in so many discussions on these topics, but I have yet to see any evidence that those attitudes have changed at all. They have had the opportunity to learn about Islam and the Muslim world, they have discussed Islam and the Muslim world with a number of different Muslims here at Kos, but there is no change. They continue to sputter in their rage against Islam.
If the 2008 presidential campaign and the Obama presidency have shown anything, it is that racism never died out. The success of the civil rights movement may have caused racists to lower their profile in the 70s and 80s, but their attitudes never went away. They were the true sleeper cells within American society. Muslims have been doing their part to resist bigotry and to organize politically, but I don't ever expect Islamophobia to ever go away in American society. For that to happen, American would need to revert en masse to Islam. Not that that couldn't happen; it's done so with a number of different cultures before, but I'm not holding my breath until that time.
Feet and Shoes in Korea and Singapore
One of the blogs I read through Google Reader is Juliette Wade's TalkToYoUniverse. Juliette is a science fiction author who blogs about the writing process. One of the topics she frequently writes about is how more realistic fictional worlds can be created by taking real-life examples and using them as the basis for fictional settings. In particular, Juliette examines cultural perspectives on different subjects, and tries to get other writers to think about how people in their fictional world/culture would approach the subject. As a former expat who lived in Japan, many of Juliette's blog posts discuss Japanese culture.
In a recent post, Juliette wrote about feet and shoes across cultures, asking, "What do you know about feet?" In the post, she discussed a number of topics about shoes and attitudes toward feet; for example, different types of shoes (e.g., Japanese fishing boots and snow boots, shoes for the bound feet of Chinese women, etc.), form vs. function in the design of shoes, walking vs. driving, and attitudes toward the wearing of shoes inside one's home or not.
Having been exposed to several different Asian cultures, I decided to comment on some of the observations I've made about the wearing of shoes in South Korea and Singapore. In my comment, I tried to complement her topics by adding additional reasons why attitudes toward shoes are the way they are here in Asia. Below is most of my comment that appears on her blog:
There are actually quite a few other factors that help determine the style and wearing of shoes in addition to those you mentioned. When I lived in Korea, their attitudes toward the wearing of shoes in the home probably mirrored that of Japan, although I can't say about whether most Koreans wore slippers within their homes. Certainly my apartment had the equivalent of the genkan (1) where shoes were taken off and left. Actually, that area next to the front door was "sunken" or, rather, the rest of the apartment floor was raised because of the onbol (2) that lie underneath the floor, providing some warmth to the room.
A lot of attitudes toward taking shoes off in the home come from practical considerations. Singaporeans universally take off shoes before entering a home (regardless of ethnicity or religion) because the climate is very wet here and one walks through lots of puddles and/or mud. Korean and Singaporean men also frequently spit and, while one tries to avoid stepping in that, one never knows if one did accidentally, so, best to take the shoes off rather than tracking that into the house as well.
Both Singapore and Korea are still developing economically, and construction sites tend to be muddy and/or dirty.
Various religious facilities (e.g., Mosques and Buddhist temples) require one to take off one's shoes before entering those buildings. (In Islam, that consideration is practical as there is no furniture in the prayer hall which allows people to walk anywhere, and one puts one's face on the carpeting during prayer.) Also, because one needs to take off one's shoes within mosques, many Muslims choose to wear shoes that don't have laces. In Singapore, sandals and flip-flops are the preferred shoe to wear to the mosque because they are the easiest to put back on when one is leaving the building.
In Singaporean and Korean homes, bathrooms tend to be wet as there are no bathtubs, thus showering is done in the middle of the bathroom floor (there's a drain in the floor for the water). Only rarely have I worn flip-flops in the bathroom; usually it's just bare feet, which also means that many Singaporeans walk around with bare feet in the rest of the house; wearing socks means needing to take them off before going into the bathroom.
Singaporeans tend to have two places to store shoes, one indoors and one outdoors. Many apartments here have an outdoor shoe rack, which may be used by family members or guests. However, many people just leave their shoes lying outside their front door when they come home and leave them there overnight. (I used to do that with a pair of flip-flops, but they were stolen, probably by an estate maintenance worker who had big feet like me. Since then I always keep my shoes indoors, unless I know I'm going to be leaving the house within an hour or two.)
One other factor is health. Several members of my family, including me, all wear sandals as our normal foot wear because we are type 2 diabetics. Type 2 diabetics are susceptible to bacterial and fungal skin infections, and closed-toe shoes are perfect environments for those types of beasties (moist, warm). With sandals the feet are drier and cooler, which helps to minimize infections (which are very painful itches). With the exception of some athletic shoes that are only worn for an hour or so at a time, I haven't worn anything but sandals since 2005. (That includes at work, so I tend to buy more stylish sandals. ;) )
One other side issue is home flooring. Singaporeans and Koreans almost exclusively use ceramic tiles for their floors. With so much dirt and mud here, people would be forever vacuuming their carpets. With tile, cleaning is much faster: just a sweep through and mopping. Those few rugs that are used here tend to be small rugs, either for the kitchen and/or bathroom or larger carpets (like a Persian rug) that's used for decorative purposes.
(1) A genkan is an area inside the front door of a Japanese home where shoes are taken off and stored before entering the rest of the house or apartment.
(2) An onbol is a set of water pipes located underneath the floor of a Korean home or apartment; the onbol heats up the floor during the winter months, helping to make the home a little bit warmer.
June 16, 2010
Aravane Rezai
A couple weeks ago a big stir was made over Rimah Fakih's being crowned Miss USA. But I was a little surprised that no one in the Muslim blogosphere (those few of us who are left) brought up the success story of French tennis player Aravane Rezai.
I first started noticing Aravane a few months ago. Currently ranked #19 in the world (her highest ranking is #16), she is one of several Muslim tennis players playing professionally today. (Another is Sania Mirza of India.) Aravane was born in France to Iranian parents, and competed for Iran in the Women's Islamic Games, winning gold medals in 2001 and 2005.
Aravane is known for a very powerful forehand shot (she puts a lot of muscle behind the ball), and recently had the biggest win in her career at the Mutua Madrilena Madrid Open, in which she upset Justine Henin, Jelena Janković and Venus Williams to win the clay court title. Unfortunately, she wasn't able to follow up that success in the French Open (where she lost in the third round); however, she reached the semifinals of the Aegon Classic, and has just defeated the number one-seed and last year's champion, Caroline Wozniacki, in the Aegon International (two grass court tournaments preparatory to Wimbeldon).
So, if you want to encourage Muslim girls with a better role model than a beauty queen, a tennis player like Aravane Rezai might make for a better choice, insha'allah.
I first started noticing Aravane a few months ago. Currently ranked #19 in the world (her highest ranking is #16), she is one of several Muslim tennis players playing professionally today. (Another is Sania Mirza of India.) Aravane was born in France to Iranian parents, and competed for Iran in the Women's Islamic Games, winning gold medals in 2001 and 2005.
Aravane is known for a very powerful forehand shot (she puts a lot of muscle behind the ball), and recently had the biggest win in her career at the Mutua Madrilena Madrid Open, in which she upset Justine Henin, Jelena Janković and Venus Williams to win the clay court title. Unfortunately, she wasn't able to follow up that success in the French Open (where she lost in the third round); however, she reached the semifinals of the Aegon Classic, and has just defeated the number one-seed and last year's champion, Caroline Wozniacki, in the Aegon International (two grass court tournaments preparatory to Wimbeldon).
So, if you want to encourage Muslim girls with a better role model than a beauty queen, a tennis player like Aravane Rezai might make for a better choice, insha'allah.
June 8, 2010
Who Wants to Be an Imam?
There was an interesting article in yesterday's (7 June 2010) Straits Times about a television show up in Malaysia called Imam Muda ("Young Imam"). The Malaysian channel Astro Oasis (which we don't get here in Singapore) has created an Apprentice-type show in which ten young men, ages 19 to 27, compete to become employed as an imam.
The first task the men had to do was perhaps the most emotionally demanding: cleaning and burying a dead body according to Muslim rites. In this particular case, the body was that of a man who had died of AIDS; the body had been lying in the morgue for a month because no one had claimed the body by that time. (While it is certainly possible the deceased's family did not claim the body for fear of contracting the HIV virus during the cleaning of the body, which frequently is done in the family's bathroom, it's also possible that this particular victim did not have any surviving family. Allahu alim [God knows best]. It should also be noted that religious mentors and forensic officers were on-hand for the cleaning and burial to supervise the potential imams.)
The channel manager, Izelan Basar, said of this particular task:
This is very true, IMO, but it also highlights the fact that the job of imam is much more than just leading prayers. In many ways, the imam has a similar occupation to that of a priest, minister or rabbi in that he needs to provide pastoral care, in whatever capacity that may take, to the people who attend his masjid. (One imam I know has talked of having performed several exorcisms.) Other tasks the contestants will face in future weeks include delivering sermons in real mosques, and visiting women's shelters and sites where unwanted babies are taken (presumably orphanages, but the word is not used in the article).
It sounds like an interesting show; too bad it hasn't been broadcast here yet.
Each aspiring imam on the show is given a task each week, and tested on his Islamic theory and practical applications, as well as leadership qualities until only one contestant remains.
The first task the men had to do was perhaps the most emotionally demanding: cleaning and burying a dead body according to Muslim rites. In this particular case, the body was that of a man who had died of AIDS; the body had been lying in the morgue for a month because no one had claimed the body by that time. (While it is certainly possible the deceased's family did not claim the body for fear of contracting the HIV virus during the cleaning of the body, which frequently is done in the family's bathroom, it's also possible that this particular victim did not have any surviving family. Allahu alim [God knows best]. It should also be noted that religious mentors and forensic officers were on-hand for the cleaning and burial to supervise the potential imams.)
The channel manager, Izelan Basar, said of this particular task:
"We believed if the contestant could face the dead body and burial process, then obviously they could face any other task in life as Muslims."
This is very true, IMO, but it also highlights the fact that the job of imam is much more than just leading prayers. In many ways, the imam has a similar occupation to that of a priest, minister or rabbi in that he needs to provide pastoral care, in whatever capacity that may take, to the people who attend his masjid. (One imam I know has talked of having performed several exorcisms.) Other tasks the contestants will face in future weeks include delivering sermons in real mosques, and visiting women's shelters and sites where unwanted babies are taken (presumably orphanages, but the word is not used in the article).
It sounds like an interesting show; too bad it hasn't been broadcast here yet.
March 1, 2010
Understanding Malaysia (I)
This post is in response to a diary over at Street Prophets, entitled Religion News: Malaysia, which discussed two recent stories, the so-called "Allah" case where the Malaysian Catholic newspaper, The Herald, has been fighting the government for the right to use the word "Allah" in its English-language publication, and an unrelated story about three women who were caned (along with four men) for adultery. I didn't have time when that diary first came out to write a lengthy comment; however, with my other priorities now fulfilled, I've been able to work on a response.
What I want to do in this post is to explain some of the context in which these two stories are set. The stories come from a country that most Americans are unfamiliar with, involving a religion that many Americans don't understand very well, in part due to all the misinformation about our religion that circulates in both the virtual and real worlds. Not surprisingly, this context is very complex and subject to frequent changes involving, among other things, Malaysian history, politics, personalities, racial and ethnic relations, and religion. I've tried to explain all these aspects as briefly as I can; however, the essay is already long enough that I've decided to split this "comment" into two posts.
Before I begin, I want to give my bona fides regarding Malaysia. I freely admit that I'm an outsider looking in. However, those of us here in Singapore are almost all, by definition, Malaysia-watchers due to the proximity between their country, peoples and cultures, and ours. Many Singaporeans, including my wife's family, have relatives in Malaysia. When Singaporeans talk about going on holiday, they normally mean traveling up to Malaysia, and indeed, I myself have made a number of trips into Malaysia since 2003. Their news often is reported by Singaporean media, and one Malaysian TV channel, with its own news program, is broadcast into Singapore. And, of course, I am married into a Malay family with whom I have discussed Malaysian culture, history and politics many, many times over the years. So, while my knowledge about Malaysia is certainly imperfect, I think I have a decent grasp about what goes on up in that country.
There are several things one must keep in mind when discussing religious news out of Malaysia: Malaysia is a melting pot of several different ethnicities and cultures. Western (Peninsular) Malaysia (which I've traveled through) is primarily made up of Malays, Chinese and Indians, whereas East Malaysia (on the west coast of the island of Borneo) is mostly made up of Bumiputera (Boo-me-poo-trah), the indigenous tribes, along with Malays and Chinese (there are hardly any Indians in East Malaysia). There have also been strong influxes of immigrants (especially illegal) to Malaysia from all over South and Southeast Asia. So ethnically, religiously, and culturally, there is a very wide mix within Malaysia.
Another factor to consider is Malaysian politics. The country is a parliamentary democracy, and has about 33 political parties; however, four parties dominate: UMNO (United Malays National Organization), DAP (Democratic Action Party), PKR (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, the People's Justice Party, most commonly known as Keadilan), and PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party). UMNO has been in power more or less since independence in 1957, working through a coalition with 11 other parties to form Barisan Nasional (National Front). This coalition is the legal holder of the Prime Minister-ship; however, it is UMNO that calls BN's shots. The other three major parties, DAP, Keadilan and PAS, recently formed their own coalition, called Pakatan Rakyat (People's Alliance). This alliance is still rather shaky, especially as its leader, Anwar Ibrahim (a former Deputy Prime Minister under Dr. Mahathir Muhammad) is in the opening stages of his second sodomy trial. Likewise, there are some lingering concerns among non-Muslims that PAS's recent "good behavior" will revert back to its original form some time in the future.
Malaysian politics have been in a state of flux since 2002, when the former Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir (he was originally a medical doctor), announced that he would retire from office in 2003, serving as PM for a total of 22 years. Dr. Mahathir is arguably the most influential man in Malaysian history, and still commands respect and admiration from many Malays. As mentioned above, Anwar Ibrahim was Dr. Mahathir's former Deputy Prime Minister, but was sacked by Mahathir in 1998; there are various suggestions as to why this was done. Anwar's replacement as DPM was Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who eventually replaced Dr. Mahathir as PM in 2003. Abdullah was generally seen as a promising replacement to Mahathir, especially with respect to getting rid of the corruption within Malaysian society. Although he won election to a second term in 2008, Abdullah was increasingly seen as a weak leader. Dr. Mahathir even quit UMNO as a protest against Abdullah's leadership. Abdullah finally resigned in April 2009, with Najib Abdul Razak (son of Malaysia's second Prime Minister) currently in office.
The 12th General Election, in March 2008, not only saw Abdullah reelected PM by a slimmer margin than he had won in 2004, it also saw the opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat, making significant gains in both the national and state parliaments. In the national parliament, BN lost a total of 58 seats while Pakatan Rakyat won a total of 62, bringing their total number of seats to 82 (36.9%), up from a total of 20 seats (9.1%) won in 2004. Keadilan had won 31 seats, up from 1 in 2004, while both DAP and PAS won 16 new seats each. In the state parliaments, Pakatan Rakyat took over five states, up from one in 2004 and two in 1999 (PAS had won the state parliaments in the previous two elections).
Now, of course, UMNO feels threatened by the rise of the Pakatan Rakyat coalition, but of the three opposition parties, UMNO feels most threatened by PAS. DAP's constituency is mostly Malaysian Chinese, along with some of the Indian population, while Keadilan's is mostly left- to moderate-Malays. PAS has traditionally targeted very conservative Muslims, while UMNO has picked up the majority of conservative Muslims who fall between Keadilan and PAS. (When I say "left," "moderate" or "conservative," I'm not using the terms associated with American politics; rather, I'm using descriptions for Muslim attitudes. If one was to compare Asians' political views to that of Americans, you'd find that many Asians are definitely left-of-center.) UMNO doesn't target Keadilan supporters because the latter are mostly anti-UMNO; however, PAS has traditionally worked toward turning Malaysia into an Islamic state (through the implementation of all aspects of Shari'ah). As a result, UMNO has tried to increase its electoral support by stealing away PAS supporters by being "more Muslim than thou." UMNO still isn't nearly as conservative as PAS was in the early 2000s, before the latter's big electoral defeat in the 2004 election, but UMNO has definitely made overtures toward the more conservative Muslims (who tend to concentrate in the north of the country).
In the meantime, I think we are seeing two distinct developments happening within the government's bureaucracy with respect to religious issues. On the one hand, I think more bureaucrats are taking advantage of the political flux to make their own judgments regarding religious issues. One example is the fatwa against yoga that was issued back in 2008. This was slapped down by the Sultan of Selangor, who said that the council which issued the fatwa should have consulted the nine Sultans of Malaysia first. Another development is that there seems to be confusion between the two sets of judiciaries (the civil courts and the Shari'ah courts) as to who has precedence over various matters. The Shari'ah courts, apparently, are either taking the lead or being referred to by the civil courts. This was one of the criticisms with respect to the caning of the three women. As the Al-Jazeera article that Ojibwa referenced notes:
However, the trend I have observed over the past few years is that if the case involves a Muslim or issues pertaining to Islam, then the Shari'ah court will have precedence, regardless of what the federal law says.
To be continued...
[For an earlier post I wrote about the "Allah" case, see The Situation in Malaysia. Cross-posted at Street Prophets.]
What I want to do in this post is to explain some of the context in which these two stories are set. The stories come from a country that most Americans are unfamiliar with, involving a religion that many Americans don't understand very well, in part due to all the misinformation about our religion that circulates in both the virtual and real worlds. Not surprisingly, this context is very complex and subject to frequent changes involving, among other things, Malaysian history, politics, personalities, racial and ethnic relations, and religion. I've tried to explain all these aspects as briefly as I can; however, the essay is already long enough that I've decided to split this "comment" into two posts.
Before I begin, I want to give my bona fides regarding Malaysia. I freely admit that I'm an outsider looking in. However, those of us here in Singapore are almost all, by definition, Malaysia-watchers due to the proximity between their country, peoples and cultures, and ours. Many Singaporeans, including my wife's family, have relatives in Malaysia. When Singaporeans talk about going on holiday, they normally mean traveling up to Malaysia, and indeed, I myself have made a number of trips into Malaysia since 2003. Their news often is reported by Singaporean media, and one Malaysian TV channel, with its own news program, is broadcast into Singapore. And, of course, I am married into a Malay family with whom I have discussed Malaysian culture, history and politics many, many times over the years. So, while my knowledge about Malaysia is certainly imperfect, I think I have a decent grasp about what goes on up in that country.
There are several things one must keep in mind when discussing religious news out of Malaysia: Malaysia is a melting pot of several different ethnicities and cultures. Western (Peninsular) Malaysia (which I've traveled through) is primarily made up of Malays, Chinese and Indians, whereas East Malaysia (on the west coast of the island of Borneo) is mostly made up of Bumiputera (Boo-me-poo-trah), the indigenous tribes, along with Malays and Chinese (there are hardly any Indians in East Malaysia). There have also been strong influxes of immigrants (especially illegal) to Malaysia from all over South and Southeast Asia. So ethnically, religiously, and culturally, there is a very wide mix within Malaysia.
Another factor to consider is Malaysian politics. The country is a parliamentary democracy, and has about 33 political parties; however, four parties dominate: UMNO (United Malays National Organization), DAP (Democratic Action Party), PKR (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, the People's Justice Party, most commonly known as Keadilan), and PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party). UMNO has been in power more or less since independence in 1957, working through a coalition with 11 other parties to form Barisan Nasional (National Front). This coalition is the legal holder of the Prime Minister-ship; however, it is UMNO that calls BN's shots. The other three major parties, DAP, Keadilan and PAS, recently formed their own coalition, called Pakatan Rakyat (People's Alliance). This alliance is still rather shaky, especially as its leader, Anwar Ibrahim (a former Deputy Prime Minister under Dr. Mahathir Muhammad) is in the opening stages of his second sodomy trial. Likewise, there are some lingering concerns among non-Muslims that PAS's recent "good behavior" will revert back to its original form some time in the future.
Malaysian politics have been in a state of flux since 2002, when the former Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir (he was originally a medical doctor), announced that he would retire from office in 2003, serving as PM for a total of 22 years. Dr. Mahathir is arguably the most influential man in Malaysian history, and still commands respect and admiration from many Malays. As mentioned above, Anwar Ibrahim was Dr. Mahathir's former Deputy Prime Minister, but was sacked by Mahathir in 1998; there are various suggestions as to why this was done. Anwar's replacement as DPM was Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who eventually replaced Dr. Mahathir as PM in 2003. Abdullah was generally seen as a promising replacement to Mahathir, especially with respect to getting rid of the corruption within Malaysian society. Although he won election to a second term in 2008, Abdullah was increasingly seen as a weak leader. Dr. Mahathir even quit UMNO as a protest against Abdullah's leadership. Abdullah finally resigned in April 2009, with Najib Abdul Razak (son of Malaysia's second Prime Minister) currently in office.
The 12th General Election, in March 2008, not only saw Abdullah reelected PM by a slimmer margin than he had won in 2004, it also saw the opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat, making significant gains in both the national and state parliaments. In the national parliament, BN lost a total of 58 seats while Pakatan Rakyat won a total of 62, bringing their total number of seats to 82 (36.9%), up from a total of 20 seats (9.1%) won in 2004. Keadilan had won 31 seats, up from 1 in 2004, while both DAP and PAS won 16 new seats each. In the state parliaments, Pakatan Rakyat took over five states, up from one in 2004 and two in 1999 (PAS had won the state parliaments in the previous two elections).
Now, of course, UMNO feels threatened by the rise of the Pakatan Rakyat coalition, but of the three opposition parties, UMNO feels most threatened by PAS. DAP's constituency is mostly Malaysian Chinese, along with some of the Indian population, while Keadilan's is mostly left- to moderate-Malays. PAS has traditionally targeted very conservative Muslims, while UMNO has picked up the majority of conservative Muslims who fall between Keadilan and PAS. (When I say "left," "moderate" or "conservative," I'm not using the terms associated with American politics; rather, I'm using descriptions for Muslim attitudes. If one was to compare Asians' political views to that of Americans, you'd find that many Asians are definitely left-of-center.) UMNO doesn't target Keadilan supporters because the latter are mostly anti-UMNO; however, PAS has traditionally worked toward turning Malaysia into an Islamic state (through the implementation of all aspects of Shari'ah). As a result, UMNO has tried to increase its electoral support by stealing away PAS supporters by being "more Muslim than thou." UMNO still isn't nearly as conservative as PAS was in the early 2000s, before the latter's big electoral defeat in the 2004 election, but UMNO has definitely made overtures toward the more conservative Muslims (who tend to concentrate in the north of the country).
In the meantime, I think we are seeing two distinct developments happening within the government's bureaucracy with respect to religious issues. On the one hand, I think more bureaucrats are taking advantage of the political flux to make their own judgments regarding religious issues. One example is the fatwa against yoga that was issued back in 2008. This was slapped down by the Sultan of Selangor, who said that the council which issued the fatwa should have consulted the nine Sultans of Malaysia first. Another development is that there seems to be confusion between the two sets of judiciaries (the civil courts and the Shari'ah courts) as to who has precedence over various matters. The Shari'ah courts, apparently, are either taking the lead or being referred to by the civil courts. This was one of the criticisms with respect to the caning of the three women. As the Al-Jazeera article that Ojibwa referenced notes:
The caning, however, has raised new questions about whether a state religious court can sentence women to be caned when federal law precludes women from such a punishment, while men below 50 can be punished by caning.
However, the trend I have observed over the past few years is that if the case involves a Muslim or issues pertaining to Islam, then the Shari'ah court will have precedence, regardless of what the federal law says.
To be continued...
[For an earlier post I wrote about the "Allah" case, see The Situation in Malaysia. Cross-posted at Street Prophets.]
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