Response to George

Would reducing or eliminating America's dependence on foreign oil undercut the economic basis of Islamophobia?

It might to a degree, but not nearly to the extent that it might have if this was the mid 70s. Although I was only a teenager at the time, the mid 70s seemed to be the main era when Islamophobia was based largely on economics. The trigger event was the oil crisis of '73-'74, which awakened the Western public to both their oil dependence and the fact that Middle Eastern society (in particular) was being built upon petrodollars. This awakening brought about a number of articles that I remember reading which tended to be anti-Arab, anti-Islam. One cartoon I remember from that era showed an Arab sheikh in his thobe and kaffiyah standing on the rim of the Grand Canyon and being told by a man in a business suit behind him that "It's not for sale." (This reminds me of the late 80s, when Japanese businesses began buying up a lot of American businesses and properties, with a resultant backlash against the Japanese at that time; Michael Crichton cashed in on that xenophobia with his book (and movie), Rising Sun.)

But since the mid 70s I'd say that the economic basis for Islamophobia has dwindled fairly dramatically. American Islamophobia today tends to be rooted in a lot of other, non-economic factors (e.g., terrorist acts committed by Muslims, American military misadventures in the Middle East (Lebanon, Iraq) and Central Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan), the Iranian hostage crisis and the dysfunctional diplomatic relationship between the US and Iran ever since, America's blind support for Israel, and the rise of a more visible, more active Muslim community, both in the U.S. and worldwide, that scares American non-Muslims both politically and religiously).

As for foreign oil, as of two years ago (June 2008, when I last wrote about this), five of the top ten countries the U.S. imported oil from were non-Muslim: Canada (who was the #1 seller of crude oil to the US at the time), Mexico, Venezuela, Angola and Ecuador). The first three of those countries provided over 44% of all the U.S.'s imported crude oil. So the U.S. is not quite as dependent upon oil from Muslim countries as perhaps they were in the past.

Personally, I don't think that, even if the U.S. didn't buy a single drop of crude oil from a Muslim country, that would stop all the Islamophobia in the U.S. Many Americans simply can't live without having someone else to hate. Some Muslims haven't helped the American (and worldwide) Muslim community with their actions, but Muslims aren't the only group currently being vilified in the U.S. at the moment. The Hispanics can attest to that.

2008 Oil Reserves Analysis

The Economist had a recent graph showing oil reserves as of the end of 2008, with the number of years remaining for each country's reserves at the 2008 rate of production. I posted a similar graph from The Economist back in June 2006, so we'll do a little analysis to see how things have gone in the past three years.

First, there have been some changes in the rankings for total reserves. The top four (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Kuwait) remain the same, but Venezuela has moved up one notch, replacing the UAE in fifth place. Russia remains at #7, but Libya has moved up to #8, replacing Kazakhstan. Numbers 10 (Nigeria), 11 (United States) and 12 (Canada) remain the same, but Qatar has moved ahead of China for 13th place. Angola comes in at #15 in the 2008 chart, up four places. Eight countries that were on the 2005 chart were omitted this time (in alphabetical order): Algeria, Azerbaijan, Brazil, India, Mexico, Norway, Oman, and Sudan).

The 2005 chart mentioned that if production were to continue at 2005's level of production, the world would have 41 years' worth of oil left. The good news is that, three years on, global supplies should actually last for another 42 years.

Doing a quick-and-dirty analysis, we can find out which countries have been winners over the past three years and which were losers. Winners are those countries whose reserves will survive longer today than they were expected to last in 2005's estimate, taking into account the three years of production that have passed. (This could happen either because more oil reserves have been proved in the past three years, because production slowed down, or both.)

In fact, all of the countries were winners, except for three; the winners being: Saudi Arabia (3.5 years), Iraq (3), Kuwait (2.6), Venezuela (30!), Russia (3.8), Libya (4.6), Nigeria (10.6), United States (3.4), Canada (12.1), Qatar (19.1), China (2.1), and Angola (2.7).

The three losers were Iran (-3.1), the UAE (-4.3), and Kazakhstan (-7.0).

The full Economist article:

Although the price of oil peaked at $147 a barrel in 2008, the world’s proven oil reserves—those that are known and recoverable with existing technology—fell only slightly, to 1,258 billion barrels, according to BP, a British oil company. That is 18% higher than in 1998. OPEC tightened its grip slightly in 2008, and commands slightly more than three-quarters of proven reserves. Saudi Arabia and Iran together account for almost one-third of the total. Venezuela, with nearly 8%, has the largest share of any non-Middle Eastern country. BP reckons that if the world continues to produce oil at the same rate as last year, global supplies will last another 42 years, even if no more oil reserves are found.

James Petras: The Iranian ‘Stolen Elections’ Hoax

The more I read about the Iranian election, the more I agree with the counter-analysis that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did, in fact, win the recent Iranian election fairly. Most of the American press (and especially bloggers) seems to be driven largely by wishful thinking, that Ahmadinejad, being the American bogey man that he's become, needed to be booted out of office, with the accusation of electoral fraud being a sufficient-enough reason to think Hossein Mousavi should have won.

Of the voices on the American political left that I've read, only Juan Cole at Informed Comment seemed to provide a reasoned explanation for why Ahmadinejad "stole" the election. However, James Petras, in this essay at GlobalResearch.ca, discusses why Cole's argument regarding ethnic and linguistic identity is not a sound indicator of voting behavior.

What many on the left fail to grasp is that so-called reform movements like Mousavi's are made up mostly of the urban elites, people like themselves. However, the more conservative voters, like in America, tend to come from rural areas. Petras brings up several examples of elections that went strongly in favor of populist/nationalist politicians (Juan Peron of Argentina, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Lula da Silva of Brazil); to which I would add Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand, whose Thai Rak Thai party ("Thai Loves Thai") was also mostly supported by the rural poor in the 2001 and 2005 general elections.

I think a lot of people on the left underestimate the electoral power of the rural poor, especially in countries that are still developing economically. While the needs and aspirations of the urban elite may be similar from country to country, even in nations as dissimilar as Iran and the US, the needs and aspirations of the rural poor are much stronger and more acute in countries like Thailand and Iran than in the prosperous US, where the red states can afford financially to vote against their economic interests in favor of social values.

I've written an additional comment below the following excerpts:

There is hardly any election, in which the White House has a significant stake, where the electoral defeat of the pro-US candidate is not denounced as illegitimate by the entire political and mass media elite. In the most recent period, the White House and its camp followers cried foul following the free (and monitored) elections in Venezuela and Gaza, while joyously fabricating an ‘electoral success’ in Lebanon despite the fact that the Hezbollah-led coalition received over 53% of the vote.

The recently concluded, June 12, 2009 elections in Iran are a classic case: The incumbent nationalist-populist President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (MA) received 63.3% of the vote (or 24.5 million votes), while the leading Western-backed liberal opposition candidate Hossein Mousavi (HM) received 34.2% or (13.2 million votes).

Iran’s presidential election drew a record turnout of more than 80% of the electorate, including an unprecedented overseas vote of 234,812, in which HM won 111,792 to MA’s 78,300. The opposition led by HM did not accept their defeat and organized a series of mass demonstrations that turned violent, resulting in the burning and destruction of automobiles, banks, public buildings and armed confrontations with the police and other authorities.

...

A number of newspaper pundits, including Gideon Rachman of the Financial Times, claim as evidence of electoral fraud the fact that Ahmadinejad won 63% of the vote in an Azeri-speaking province against his opponent, Mousavi, an ethnic Azeri. The simplistic assumption is that ethnic identity or belonging to a linguistic group is the only possible explanation of voting behavior rather than other social or class interests.

A closer look at the voting pattern in the East-Azerbaijan region of Iran reveals that Mousavi won only in the city of Shabestar among the upper and the middle classes (and only by a small margin), whereas he was soundly defeated in the larger rural areas, where the re-distributive policies of the Ahmadinejad government had helped the ethnic Azeris write off debt, obtain cheap credits and easy loans for the farmers. Mousavi did win in the West-Azerbaijan region, using his ethnic ties to win over the urban voters. In the highly populated Tehran province, Mousavi beat Ahmadinejad in the urban centers of Tehran and Shemiranat by gaining the vote of the middle and upper class districts, whereas he lost badly in the adjoining working class suburbs, small towns and rural areas.

The careless and distorted emphasis on ‘ethnic voting’ cited by writers from the Financial Times and New York Times to justify calling Ahmadinejad ‘s victory a ‘stolen vote’ is matched by the media’s willful and deliberate refusal to acknowledge a rigorous nationwide public opinion poll conducted by two US experts just three weeks before the vote, which showed Ahmadinejad leading by a more than 2 to 1 margin – even larger than his electoral victory on June 12. This poll revealed that among ethnic Azeris, Ahmadinejad was favored by a 2 to 1 margin over Mousavi, demonstrating how class interests represented by one candidate can overcome the ethnic identity of the other candidate (Washington Post June 15, 2009). The poll also demonstrated how class issues, within age groups, were more influential in shaping political preferences than ‘generational life style’. According to this poll, over two-thirds of Iranian youth were too poor to have access to a computer and the 18-24 year olds “comprised the strongest voting bloc for Ahmadinejad of all groups” (Washington Post June 15, 2009).

The only group, which consistently favored Mousavi, was the university students and graduates, business owners and the upper middle class. The ‘youth vote’, which the Western media praised as ‘pro-reformist’, was a clear minority of less than 30% but came from a highly privileged, vocal and largely English speaking group with a monopoly on the Western media. Their overwhelming presence in the Western news reports created what has been referred to as the ‘North Tehran Syndrome’, for the comfortable upper class enclave from which many of these students come. While they may be articulate, well dressed and fluent in English, they were soundly out-voted in the secrecy of the ballot box.

In general, Ahmadinejad did very well in the oil and chemical producing provinces. This may have be a reflection of the oil workers’ opposition to the ‘reformist’ program, which included proposals to ‘privatize’ public enterprises. Likewise, the incumbent did very well along the border provinces because of his emphasis on strengthening national security from US and Israeli threats in light of an escalation of US-sponsored cross-border terrorist attacks from Pakistan and Israeli-backed incursions from Iraqi Kurdistan, which have killed scores of Iranian citizens. Sponsorship and massive funding of the groups behind these attacks is an official policy of the US from the Bush Administration, which has not been repudiated by President Obama; in fact it has escalated in the lead-up to the elections.

What Western commentators and their Iranian protégés have ignored is the powerful impact which the devastating US wars and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan had on Iranian public opinion: Ahmadinejad’s strong position on defense matters contrasted with the pro-Western and weak defense posture of many of the campaign propagandists of the opposition.

The great majority of voters for the incumbent probably felt that national security interests, the integrity of the country and the social welfare system, with all of its faults and excesses, could be better defended and improved with Ahmadinejad than with upper-class technocrats supported by Western-oriented privileged youth who prize individual life styles over community values and solidarity.

...

Amhadinejad’s electoral success, seen in historical comparative perspective should not be a surprise. In similar electoral contests between nationalist-populists against pro-Western liberals, the populists have won. Past examples include Peron in Argentina and, most recently, Chavez of Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia and even Lula da Silva in Brazil, all of whom have demonstrated an ability to secure close to or even greater than 60% of the vote in free elections. The voting majorities in these countries prefer social welfare over unrestrained markets, national security over alignments with military empires.

...

The wild card in the aftermath of the elections is the Israeli response: Netanyahu has signaled to his American Zionist followers that they should use the hoax of ‘electoral fraud’ to exert maximum pressure on the Obama regime to end all plans to meet with the newly re-elected Ahmadinejad regime.

Paradoxically, US commentators (left, right and center) who bought into the electoral fraud hoax are inadvertently providing Netanyahu and his American followers with the arguments and fabrications: Where they see religious wars, we see class wars; where they see electoral fraud, we see imperial destabilization.

I also wanted to say that President Obama has done the right thing by not getting involved as the Iranians settle their electoral results. The Republicans, such as John McCain, who have tried to goad Obama into interfering with Iranian politics, have shown a tremendous amount of arrogance and hypocrisy on their part. If another country were to interfere with the American electoral process, they would be rightly indignant. Why they think they can interfere with another country's election is beyond me. Shut up, John!

Petroleum and Natural Gas Proved Reserves, 2009, Top 10

This is an annual post; the data is only updated annually. For the 2008 data, please click here.

The Energy Information Administration, a department of the U.S. Department of Energy, has recently released the January 1, 2009 proved reserves for petroleum and natural gas. Proved reserves are the amount of oil and gas in the ground that is "reasonably certain" to be extracted using current technology at current prices. The following are lists of the top ten countries for petroleum and natural gas proved reserves, with their quantities and percentage of the world total for 2009:

Petroleum - Billion Barrels
1. Saudi Arabia - 266.710 (19.87%)
2. Canada - 178.092 (13.27%)
3. Iran - 136.150 (10.14%)
4. Iraq - 115.000 (8.57%)
5. Kuwait - 104.000 (7.75%)
6. Venezuela - 99.377 (7.40%)
7. United Arab Emirates - 97.800 (7.29%)
8. Russian Federation - 60.000 (4.47%)
9. Libya - 43.660 (3.25%)
10. Nigeria - 36.220 (2.70%)

Notes:

• The world total of proved reserves is 1,342.207 billion barrels of petroleum, an increase of 10.164 billion barrels over 2008's total (a 0.76% increase).
  
• The total of the top ten countries makes up 84.71% of the world's proved reserves.
  
• Venezuela was the only country to move up in the rankings, having placed seventh in 2008; the United Arab Emirates dropped one place, to seventh.
  
• Canada's proved reserves are estimated to be 5.4 billion barrels of conventional crude oil and 173.2 billion barrels of oil sands reserves. (Oil sands are much more costly to refine than conventional crude oil.)
  
• Two countries had singificant increases in their amounts of crude oil proved reserves in 2008: Venezuela, with an increase of 12.342 billion barrels, and Libya, with an increase of 2.196 billion barrels. Ten other countries also had increases in their proved reserves as well; however, the highest amount of any of the ten was 442 million barrels (Brazil).
  
• Two countries had significant depletions in their amounts of crude oil proved reserves in 2008: Iran, with a decrease of 2.250 billion barrels, and Mexico, with a decrease of 1.149 billion barrels. Thirteen other countries also had decreases in their proved reserves.

Natural Gas - Trillion Cubic Feet
1. Russian Federation - 1,680.000 (26.86%)
2. Iran - 991.600 (15.85%)
3. Qatar - 891.945 (14.26%)
4. Saudi Arabia - 258.470 (4.13%)
5. United States - 237.726 (3.80%)
6. United Arab Emirates - 214.400 (3.43%)
7. Nigeria - 184.160 (2.94%)
8. Venezuela - 170.920 (2.73%)
9. Algeria - 159.000 (2.54%)
10. Iraq - 111.940 (1.79%)

Notes:

• The world total of proved reserves is 6,254.364 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, an increase of 42.029 trillion cubic feet (a 0.68% increase). (I've noted a discrepancy in the difference between 2008 and 2009, coming up with an increase of 41.714 trillion cubic feet, a difference of 0.315 trillion cubic feet.)
  
• The total of the top ten countries makes up 78.35% of the world's proved reserves.
  
• There were no changes in the top ten rankings.
  
• Twelve countries had increases in their total proved reserves in 2008, for a total of 83.968 trillion cubic feet; however, this was partially offset by decreases in a total of fourteen countries, with depletions of 42.254 trillion cubic feet.

Oil: America's Smack

Another pop quiz, hotshot! Name the number one oil importer to the United States.

Saudi Arabia? Guess again. It's Canada. In fact, Saudi Arabia comes in third, after Mexico. Yes, you may have thought that the Middle East provided the United States with most of its oil, but that's not true either. In 2004, Persian Gulf countries (defined by the US Department of Energy as consisting of Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) only provided 2,400 thousand barrels of oil per day (tbpd) or 23.80% of the 10,084 tbpd total imported. If you expand the list to include other Middle Eastern countries not located in the Persian Gulf (e.g., Algeria, Libya, Syria, etc.), the total goes up to a mere 2,648 tbpd or 26.26% of the total. Finally, if you expand the list to include all Muslim-majority countries around the world (e.g., Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.), the quantity is 3,793 tbpd or 37.61% of the total. In other words, only a little over 1/3 of America's oil imports come from Muslim countries.

“America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world,” Mr Bush said in his State of the Union address. “By applying the talent and technology of America, this country can dramatically improve our environment, move beyond a petroleum-based economy and make our dependence on Middle Eastern oil a thing of the past.” (Source: Financial Times)

I agree that America is addicted to oil. There's no question about that. And I have no problem with the Bush administration trying to move beyond a petroleum-based economy through "talent and technology." There's nothing wrong with that either.

But saying that the Bush administration's goal is to cut American consumption of Middle Eastern oil by 75% by 2025 is merely a smokescreen for the ignorant. There's nothing wrong with the goal per se, but the goal won't make any real dent in America's oil addiction. If the Bush administration really wanted to cut out 75% of Middle Eastern oil, they could do so now by stopping the importation of Saudi Arabian and Iraqi oil. Those two countries, in 2004, accounted for 2,150 tbpd out of the Middle East's total of 2,648 tbpd, or 85.08% of the Middle East's total. Boom! You've not only gone past the 75% mark, but cut an additional 10% beyond that.

But like any junkie, America will move from one supplier to another. Instead of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the US will probably move on to one of the other big producers (if they can): Canada (1,616 tbpd or 16.03%), Mexico (1,598 tbpd or 15.85%) or Nigeria (1,078 tbpd or 10.69%). (Venezuela is the only other large importer, sending 1,297 tbpd or 12.86%, but - obviously - recent relations with that country's government would nix that idea.)

A better suggestion by the President would have been to cut overall oil imports into the country by, say, 25%. Instead of importing 10,084 tbpd, how about dropping the number by 2,521 tbpd to 7,563 tbpd? That would not only be equivalent to stopping all imports from the Middle East, but would also provide real incentives to car and oil companies to find a meaningful solution to America's oil addiction.

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In the meantime, the President's speech ignores reality. As he said, oil is "often imported from unstable parts of the world." And, of course, we're supposed to infer that the "unstable parts" include the Middle East and Venezuela. But even if the US imported oil from "stable parts of the world," that oil in the "unstable parts" will still be sought out by other countries. All of the world is "addicted" to oil, not just the United States. If the US stopped importing Saudi Arabian and Iraqi oil, as I suggested above, other countries (e.g., China, the European Union, Japan, etc.) would gladly pick up the slack. The oil is not going to go away. Moreover, as Frank Verrastro, director and senior fellow in the Center for Strategic and International Studies energy program said, “Even if America doesn’t import a drop of Middle Eastern oil, these countries will still play an increasingly important role in determining how much we pay for oil. You pay the global price and it doesn’t matter where you buy it from.”

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Other reactions to Bush's speech included:

Myron Ebell, director at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank: “The president’s hackneyed and dangerous energy rhetoric that we are addicted to oil is an indication that the administration is addicted to confused thinking about energy policies. [His goals] will be hindrances to creating a bright energy future for American consumers.”

Jim Footner of Greenpeace: “We’ll wait and see what concrete action [Mr Bush] takes before getting our hopes up. After all, there is a treaty to reduce America’s dependence on oil – it’s called Kyoto, and Bush walked away from it.”

Bill Prindle, the deputy director of the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy: "The administration has made much of its investment in energy efficient technology. However, much of this has been a reallocation of research funds. The budget requests from the White House for funding on energy efficiency has actually fallen 14 per cent in real terms since 2002."