Islam/Muslim Blog Links (10 June 2009)

Austrolabe: Barack Obama Addresses the Muslim World

Bin Gregory Productions: Berjayalah Taskiku! (This was a very interesting and personal post about Muslim primary education in Malaysia and a sports day event that some of Bin Gregory's kids participated in. Very enjoyable to read.)

Dr. M's Analysis: Foiled Robber Begs For Mercy, Asks To Join Islam (See also Muslim Apple: Criticism: Muslim Storekeeper & the Robber Convert)

Fragments of Me: Longing for the Divine (An interesting comment in this post: "...every Muslim is a Sufi but not every Sufi is a Muslim.")

Grande Strategy: Islam Revives in Al-Andalus (Spain)

Grande Strategy: BBC: An Islamic History of Europe

Islamophobia Watch: Mad Mel explains the BNP's success

Islamophobia Watch: Thug demands 'what's your religion' before launching racist attack

Islamophobia Watch: Sharia law 'same as Krays', says Tebbit

Islamophobia Watch: Global Day of Prayer London convenor claims Muslims 'want to take over'

Islamophobia Watch: Resisting extremism in Luton

Izzy Mo's Blog: Reactions to the Nashia Post (A follow-up to Nasiha for Single Women.)

Izzy Mo's Blog: Obama's Speech to the Muslim World

Muslim Apple: What's in a Name?

Muslim Apple: Mormon Dawah, Witnesses, Shahadah Twice, & AlMaghrib

Naeem's Blog: Going Primitive

The Zen of South Park: Quran Read-A-Long: Al-`Imran 10-20 Discuss Hell and Surrender to God

Quran Read-A-Long: Al-’Imran 21-30 Speaks of Judgment Day and Allies

Umar Lee: A Story of the Stages to Being Homeless (The good news is that "B" is getting help, alhamdulillah!)

Umar Lee: Obama Speech to the Muslim World and My Thoughts

International Politics Links (8 June 2009)

My series of links posts, which went on a brief hiatus last week, resumes tonight with two major changes. The first is that I've decided to go with a revolving format; for example, international politics will be every Monday, insha'allah. My tentative schedule for the remainder of the week is: Tuesdays - Business/Economics, Wednesdays - Islam/Muslim Blogs, Thursdays - Miscellaneous (e.g., science, science fiction, photos, etc.), and Fridays - Open. Of course, all of this is subject to change without notice.

The other big change is that I've decided not to do links for American politics, for two reasons: one, it's such a fast-moving and huge topic that to do it justice would mean a daily commitment, one which I'm not sure I want to make; and two, most of the political blogs I read follow the philosophy of "know thy enemy," which, in this case is the Republican party. The sheer stupidity and evil of many Republicans really disgust me. I've decided I'd rather not comment on those matters for the most part, although I may occasionally link to posts about American politics in so far as it deals with international politics and economics.

With regard to international politics, I've separated links into geographical areas (continents) for the most part. For example, in today's post, links are for Europe, the Middle East and Asia, with "Miscellaneous" being for other parts of the world or multiple countries discussed in the post. Within each geographical area, I've tried to alphabetize the countries mentioned. So, once more, for example, with respect to the Middle East the countries are Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Syria.

And, of course, if my readers have legitimate suggestions for links, please add them in the comments.


Europe:
Majid: Dangerous Purities (An interesting guest op-ed essay on the 400th anniversary of the expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain. The Moriscos were Spaniards of Muslim descent, either themselves or their parents/grandparents, who had converted from Islam to Christianity. But even their conversion was not enough to satisfy the Catholics, so roughly 300,000 Moriscos, or five percent of the Spanish population, was forced to flee their own country, with most of them dying in the process.)

Biased Election Reporting (On the German results for the European Parliament election.)

Russian Warns Against Relying on Dollar


Middle East:
Obama in the Middle East

Reactions to Obama's Speech

Obama's Speech in Cairo (Juan Cole)

Obama's Speech In Cairo (Moon of Alabama)

Iraqi Prime Minister Warned Obama About Photos: 'Baghdad Will Burn'

It's Only Make-Believe: Bush Policy on Israeli Settlement Freeze Was An 'Understanding'

Obama and Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

OSC: Israeli Press on Obama's Cairo Address

Netanyahu's Problem

UN: Israeli Buffer Zone Eats Up 30 Percent of Gaza's Arable Land

Jewish Settlers Rampage in West Bank

March 14 Faction Wins in Lebanon

OSC: Pakistani Editorialists Respond to Obama

Thousands Flee Mingora in Panic; Army advances toward Kalam; 9 Soldiers Killed, 27 militants

Mysterious 'Chip' is CIA's Latest Weapon Against al-Qaida Targets Hiding in Pakistan's Tribal Belt ("Don't like your neighbor? Drop a chip in his house and the CIA will bomb him.")

Syrian Newspapers on Obama's Arab Tour (OSC)


Asia:
Made in China Means Quality

American Journalists Sentenced In North Korea To 12 Years Labor Camp

Star War Fantasy Drill (Is North Korea a military threat to America? No, and a military hardware project called the "star war fantasy drill" from the US budget, to the howls of protest by some.)

Seoul Boosts Forces Against N Korea


Miscellaneous:
Fleischer criticizes Obama’s Cairo speech as being too ‘balanced.’

EU And Lebanon Elections

NYT Finally Runs ‘Editor’s Note’ Correction To Misleading Gitmo Detainee ‘Recidivism’ Story

Jizya: Amounts Paid in the Treaties of Orihuela and Misr (Egypt)

One of the complaints about Islam by Islamophobes is the issue of jizya, the tax levied on non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic state. In return for the payment of the jizya, non-Muslims were permitted to practice their faith, to enjoy a measure of communal autonomy, to be entitled to Muslim protection from outside aggression, to be exempted from military service and taxes levied upon Muslim citizens. What has never been brought up in any argument I've read against the jizya is exactly how much was paid by the non-Muslims. In another of my posts about Hugh Kennedy's book, The Great Arab Conquests (yes, I am almost finished with the book ;) ), Kennedy addresses this issue in several passages. The first passage is with respect to the Treaty of Orihuela (pp. 315-16):

We are better informed about the conquest of the area around Murcia in south-east Spain. This was ruled by a Visigothic noble called Theodemir (Tudmīr). He negotiated a treaty with Abd al-Azīz, of which the text, dated April 713 [Rajab, 94 A.H.], is recorded in several Arabic sources.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. This text was written by Abd al-Azīz b. Mūsā b. Nusayr for Tudmīr b. Ghabdush, establishing a treaty of peace and the promise and protection of God and His Prophet (may God bless him and grant him His peace). We [Abd al-Azīz] will not set any special conditions for him or for any among his men, nor harass him, nor remove him from power. His followers will not be killed or taken prisoner, nor will they be separated from their women and children. They will not be coerced in matters of religion, their churches will not be burned, nor will sacred objects be taken from the realm as long as Theodemir remains sincere and fulfils the following conditions we have set for him:

He has reached a settlement concerning seven towns: Orihuela, Valentilla, Alicante, Mula, Bigastro, Ello and Lorca.

He will not give shelter to fugitives, nor to our enemies, nor encourage any protected person to fear us, nor conceal news of our enemies.

He and each of his men shall also pay one dinar every year, together with four measures of wheat, four measures of barley, four liquid measures of concentrated fruit juice, four liquid measures of vinegar, four of honey and four of olive oil. Slaves much [sic; must] each pay half of this.

Kennedy continues:

This treaty is a classic example of the sort of local agreements that were the reality of Arab "conquest" in many areas of the caliphate. It is clear that rather than embark on a difficult and costly campaign, the Muslims preferred to make an agreement that would grant them security from hostile activities and some tribute. It is a pattern we can observe in many areas of Iran and Transoxania. It is interesting to note that much of this tribute was taken in kind (wheat, barley, vinegar, oil, but of course no wine). In exchange for this, the local people were allowed almost complete autonomy. Theodemir was clearly expected to continue to rule his seven towns and the rural areas attached to them. There is no indication that any Muslim garrison was established, nor that any mosques were built. Theodemir and many of his followers may have imagined that the Muslim conquest would be fairly short lived and that it was worth paying up to preserve their possessions until such time as the Visigothic kingdom was restored. In fact it was to be five centuries before Christian powers re-established control over this area. We do not know how long the agreement was in force: Theodemir himself died, full of years and distinction, in 744. It is likely that it was never formally abolished but rather that as Muslim immigration and the conversion of local people to Islam increased in the late eighth and ninth centuries, its provisions became increasingly irrelevant.

In another passage, with respect to the Treaty of Misr (Egypt), Kennedy writes (pp. 153-54):

It was probably at this time that the document known as the Treaty of Misr (Egypt) between the Muslims and the Byzantine authorities was drawn up, though the exact context of this document remains unclear. It is in many ways similar to the treaty Umar had made with Jerusalem and was presumably modeled on it. It begins with a general clause safeguarding the people their religion (millat), their property, their crucifixes, their lands and their waterways. They would be obliged to pay the jizya (tribute) every year when the rise of the Nile (ziyādat nahrihim) was over. If the river failed to rise properly, payment would be reduced in proportion. If anyone did not agree to it, he would not pay the tribute but he would not receive protection. Romans and Nubians who wanted to enjoy the same terms might do so and those who did not were free to leave.

...

In many of them [different written accounts about the treaty] the tax to be paid was assessed at 2 dinars per adult male except for the poor. Some also said that the Egyptians should provide the Muslims with supplies. Each landowner (dhī ard) was to provide 210 kilos of wheat, 4 liters of oil, 4 liters of honey and 4 liters of vinegar (but, of course, no wine). They were also to get clothing: each Muslim was to be given a woolen jubba, a burnūs or turban, a pair of trousers (sarāwīl) and a pair of shoes. It may be that many of these south Arabians had arrived very ill prepared for the coolness of an Egyptian winter.

In other words, the jizya paid per person in terms of currency was a very nominal amount. It would be like asking for a tax of one or two dollars per person; the poor, any slaves, presumably women and children would either pay a lower amount or be exempted altogether. The in-kind payments of food and clothing would cost more, but these were no doubt requested by the Arab armies because their soldiers needed the supplies. As Kennedy points out (p. 334), Arab soldiers were expected to provide their own equipment and pay for their own food. Once the payment was made, life went on as before. Muslim armies charged less in terms of the jizya if the town submitted peacefully instead of battling with the army (probably what the slave had told the people at Junday-Shapur, who quickly realized how much cheaper it would be for them to pay the tribute than to fight the Muslims; in fact, Kennedy tells of a number of cities that came to the same decision).

Jizya, then, was not the crushing tax burden one finds in ancient Greek and Roman histories. It was a relatively small amount paid by the non-Muslims; as more and more people became Muslim, the amount paid for jizya actually shrank over time. Of course, we Muslims have our own taxes (e.g., zakat).

Update: As promised earlier, here is one more passage from the book that suggests that the jizya was not terribly oppressive, at least at first. From page 373:

Although we cannot be clear about this, it is possible that the Arabs were, initially at least, less demanding of the resources and services of the ordinary people than their Byzantine and Sasanian predecessors, and the taxes they imposed may actually have been lower. It is not until the end of the seventh century that we get complaints about oppressive tax gathering.

Photo credit: A street in Lorca, Spain, by Howzey

Movie Sunday: Lawrence of Arabia

This is another of my favorite movies (and one in which Milady finds something else to do while I watch it ;) ). And yet, as is frequently the case with respect to "historical" films, sifting the "Hollywood" away from the history can be a daunting task, especially for a film like Lawrence of Arabia in which there are serious debates not only about the accuracy of the historical events portrayed, but also about the man himself. Regardless, the movie has long been recognized for its excellence, and has frequently been listed among a number of "Top 10" lists of all-time movies. We also have this film to thank for inspiring a certain contemporary film director to go into film-making for his career.

Interesting facts about Lawrence of Arabia:

No woman has a speaking role in the entire movie.

While the movie was originally planned to be filmed entirely in Jordan, many scenes were filmed in either Morocco (desert scenes and the Tafas massacre, where the Morrocan army was used to play the Ottoman army) and Spain (the attack on Aqaba, the train attacks, the city scenes of Cairo and Jerusalem, and all the interior scenes).

Henry Oscar, who has a small role in the film and recites an English translation from the Qur'an, received permission from Jordanian authorities to do so only on condition that an imam be present to ensure that there were no misquotes.

During the filming of the movie, King Hussein of Jordan met and later married an English secretary working on the set, Antoinette "Toni" Gardiner (now Princess Muna al-Hussein). Her first-born son from this marriage is King Abdullah II of Jordan.

Well, I'll tell you. It's a little clash of temperament that's going on in there. Inevitably, one of them's half-mad - and the other, wholly unscrupulous.

Young men make wars, and the virtues of war are the virtues of young men: courage, and hope for the future. Then old men make the peace, and the vices of peace are the vices of old men: mistrust and caution.

Wind of Change

I came across this article from Islamica Magazine at Age of Jahiliyah. The article resonated with me in a number of respects. For example, the very first sentence: "Surveys of Islamic art tend to venture no further east than India." Having just purchased Robert Hillenbrand's book, Islamic Art and Architecture, this past week, it quickly became apparent that, geographically, the art and architecture covered in the book doesn't go even as far as India. Afghanistan seems to be the furthest east (I haven't seen anything in the book so far for Pakistan, let alone India and all the other Muslim lands east). Likewise, while there is some material in the book on Spain and Sicily, southeastern Europe appears to be completely ignored, as is sub-Saharan Africa.

The thing is, there's a lot of good and interesting Islamic artwork here in SE Asia; it's just that it's largely ignored. The climate here does affect the artwork's ability to survive over long periods of time, though. For example, as the article says, "Although Qur’anic works have been copied locally for many centuries, the climate is not kind to paper." This is very true. I receive a monthly newspaper from the States, but almost never take it out of its plastic bag now because, if I do, the cheap newsprint paper will turn dark brown and be almost unreadable within a year or two.

On the other hand, the statement, "...traditional Malay mosques are well ventilated and perfectly suited to a tropical climate." This is true for some masajid in Malaysia (and probably Indonesia and Brunei), but even this style is dying out in some parts of SE Asia. For example, many masajid in Singapore (and some that I've visited in Malaysia) are built of more permanent materials (e.g., cement and concrete), preserving some of the older masajid and giving us both a sense of the history of the Malay Muslim community (some of the masajid are well over 150 years old) and an understanding of their architectural influences, which are often an amalgamation of various styles (for example, Singapore's Masjid Sultan (the closest building we have to a national masjid) is a mix of Classical, Persian, Moorish and Turkish themes that form what is known as the Islamic Saracenic style).

Still, institutions like the Islamic Arts Museum Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur (which I have visited) are doing a good job at preserving and promoting SE Asian Islamic arts. But it also wouldn't hurt for more scholarly interest to be shown in the Islamic artwork east of Iran.


The monsoon winds brought Islam to Southeast Asia. Lucien de Guise wonders when interest in the region’s Islamic art will arrive...

Surveys of Islamic art tend to venture no further east than India. Similarly, art historians have shown a long-standing lack of interest in the output of Muslim artists from sub-Saharan Africa. The same applies to Islam in Europe, unless it happens to be Spain or Sicily, which have acquired perhaps the greatest mystique of all. Islamic art of the Balkans does not have the same allure, partly because it is of a more recent vintage and includes embarrassing items such as wine cups.

The conventional approach has for more than a century determined that Islamic art comes from the “heartlands” and everything else is ethnographic. No one can say that the quantity of books on Islamic art is anything but massive, especially when the number of collectors is so small. The geographical range is, however, very limited. Books may occasionally mention China or Southeast Asia, but seldom do they show what works from so far east actually look like. To find a volume dedicated to Islamic art from these regions is almost inconceivable.

China remains off-limits; it is of little interest to Islamic Art historians and only arouses the curiosity of Sinologists when an artifact turns out to be of Ming imperial quality. Southeast Asian works have, however, acquired more recognition recently. The Message & The Monsoon, a pioneering exhibition at the Islamic Arts Museum Malaysia, is the first attempt to put the art of Southeast Asia into an Islamic context. The title takes its name from the summer and winter monsoon winds that brought trade, prosperity and Islam to the region. Works that are typically viewed as being merely “regional” are examined for their relevance to neigh-boring religious traditions and the world of Islam. To examine Islamic artifacts in Southeast Asia is less divisive than it would be in that other overlooked Far Eastern nursery of Islamic culture. Malay world objects do not suffer from the outright hostility that is found in China. For at least three centuries the central authorities of the Middle Kingdom have felt threatened by Islam. This has continued into the 21st century. The means of oppression have become less severe than in the past, when the simplest way to deal with unrest was to massacre Chinese Muslim communities.

Maritime Southeast Asia is a very different proposition. As its population is mostly Muslim, there is less reason for the Islamic art of the region to have been so overlooked. However, it took the Bali bombing in 2002 to remind the world that this large pocket of Islam existed at all. Last December’s Asian tsunami provided another reminder. The area most affected, with the loss of well over 100,000 lives, was Aceh. This province of north Sumatra received more attention over a few hours than it had in three decades of conflict between Muslim separatists and Indonesia’s central government.

As the death toll mounted, international awareness of the catastrophe became intense enough for charity football matches to be played by major European clubs. The Acehnese loss that received no attention was the destruction of its heritage. Once known as the “verandah of Mecca”, this was the launching pad of Islam in Southeast Asia around 700 years ago. Within a century or so, most of the region’s islands had become Muslim. It was one of the fastest and most peaceful conversions in the history of Islam. Other local religious communities—Hindu, Christian and animist—have generally lived in peace with the new Muslim majority, despite the occasional outbursts of church burnings in Sulawesi or head-hunting expeditions in Borneo. The different societies that have coexisted since the fall of the Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms have much in common. Unlike many parts of world, their differences have seldom been exploited for political gain.

The art of the region has an equally multicultural feel to it, with the same techniques and similar products being used throughout the archipelago and in the Malay peninsula. Despite this, the works of Muslim communities have a special identity. Their unique approach is a fusion of Islamic principles with vestiges of the Hindu-Buddhist past. By making small changes, the results became overwhelmingly Islamic—not only different from their non-Muslim neighbours, but also distinct from the art of other parts of the Islamic world.

The uniqueness of Southeast Asian art owes much to the region’s topography. Unlike the arid territories through which Islam first spread, Southeast Asia is hot and humid. Vegetation is abundant and the only sand to be found is on the beach. It is a less austere environment than that in which the three great monotheistic religions emerged. God’s bounty is all around and little effort is required to harvest it. Sit-ting under the right sort of tree will ensure a windfall, in the metaphorical sense at least, as wind is a comparatively rare phenomenon in these gentle climes. The two monsoons are the closest to violent weather as one can get. They are still manageable enough to be useful for sailing, although not for the huge quantity of trade that passed through the “Spice Islands” in the days before steamships.

The importance and proliferation of nature is the most conspicuous feature of Southeast Asia’s Islamic art. Whether it is a machete or a manuscript, flowers and tendrils are bound to make a showing. Just about every item of aesthetic value from the Malay world shares this homage to the natural world. In a land such as Arabia, it was to the boundless sky that artists looked for inspiration, seeing God in the infinite. In Southeast Asia, the sky is more often obscured by a tree. Instead, the concept of God the Infinite is represented in trailing arabesques of flora or a geometric fruit.

The concept of “fine art” in the Western tradition is as absent from the Malay world as it is from most parts of the Islamic world. There are virtually no paintings or sculptures. The “applied arts” are at the core of the region’s oeuvre, beautifying the mundane and at the same time paying homage to the Almighty. To some extent there is a hierarchy of media. The written word occupies the highest rung. Copies of the Qur’an are at the summit of all Islamic arts, and in Southeast Asia there is as distinctive an appearance with the holy book as with every other product of the artist’s atelier. The influence of longer-established Islamic societies is highly visible, which was inevitable when missionaries came from India, the Middle East and China. Despite this, there is still a unique identity to Southeast Asian religious manuscripts. They tend to use less gold and are plainer over-all than the Qur’ans from India, Persia or the Ottoman empire. This lack of ostentation conveys a purity that is some-times as striking as the North African Qur’ans from the first centuries of Islam. Invariably, plant life will be incorporated in the designs.

As is common with most of Southeast Asia’s output, manuscripts are seldom older than a couple of hundred years. This is another factor that has given the region’s oeuvre less credibility than that of the heartlands. Although Qur’anic works have been copied locally for many centuries, the climate is not kind to paper. The same applies to what might be considered the region’s second-highest art form. The region’s early Islamic buildings differed from those of Hindu-Buddhist societies, which had emphasized stone structures. The preferred Islamic approach was wood. It is not clear whether this was in deliberate opposition to the extravagance of their predecessors or whether there was a lack of skilled stonemasons at the beginning of the Islamic period. The results are certainly no match for a Buddhist temple like Borobudur in Java.

Despite their lack of grandeur and longevity, the wooden mosques of the Malay world mark a notable contribution to Islam. With three-tiered roofs and no trace of the later onion domes and ogival arches, traditional Malay mosques are well ventilated and perfectly suited to a tropical climate. It does not follow that superior function take an architectural style into the Islamic hall of fame. The mosques of Southeast Asia receive even less attention than the decorative arts.

The artifacts that have received the consideration of scholars and collectors for several centuries are weapons and textiles. Occupying opposite extremes of the aesthetic spectrum, both have been viewed in their Southeast Asian rather than Islamic context. Among weapons, the kris is the most well known. With a characteristic blade that is often wavy and always flares toward the hilt, it has long been accepted as an effective killing instrument with mystical properties. Although its origins are undoubtedly pre-Islamic, there have been modifications to make it more appropriate for Muslim users. Hilts that once glorified Hindu deities were given abstract form after the arrival of Islam. Occasional Qur’anic inscriptions on the blades are another indicator of new patronage. Similar inscriptions occur on other regional weapons, including swords and spearheads of great technical accomplishment. Islam may not always have been as supremely pacific as some suggest, but there can be no denying that this was a faith that fully realized the aesthetics of warfare.

Beautifying every aspect of life was once central to most parts of Islam. The effort is less conspicuous these days. Magnificent clothing used to be an expression of devotion, and Islamic textiles from Andalusia to Southeast Asia were universally admired. It was not unusual for Catholic priests’ vestments to be discreetly adorned with the Shahada. In the Malay world, textiles were a symbol of status and religion. Although other parts of the region had equally high regard for the weaver’s art—as much the domain of women as weapons were of men—the Muslim approach was distinctive.

Sometimes the difference between the cloth of a Muslim and a Hindu is not immediately apparent. Plentiful use of silk and gold would hardly please observers who are aware of the hadith that discourages males from wearing these materials. Southeast Asian Islamic textiles win more pious approval when it comes to figural representation. As with weapons, anthropomorphic images in weavings are heavily abstracted. Where they exist at all, they are usually a graphic device created from calligraphic elements, such as the birds that often appear on Javanese batiks.

It is not just the design of a textile that indicates the wearer’s religion; another Islamic aspect to Malay world weavings is the way they were worn. A different approach to modesty was noticeable in the Muslim communities. Going topless may have been acceptable in Hindu Bali, but it certainly wasn’t among the region’s Muslims. Cloths with religious inscriptions were especially revered and often had talismanic properties. This may not be entering into the anti-superstition spirit of the faith, but it is a weakness that has been shared by many communities.

The most highly regarded inscribed cloths were those cut from the kiswah covering the Ka‘ba in Mecca. These could be tailored into waistcoats and other apparel conveying exceptional status—the owner would have needed to be extremely influential to secure a sample from the kiswah, even if it was replaced every year. The prestige of these items lay almost entirely in their sacred association. Imported goods also gave them a special position. The holy cities were a highly desirable place of origin, but almost anywhere from outside the region had cachet. Exquisite as their own goods were, rich members of the Malay world did not necessarily want to shop locally. Weavings from many other places were sought after. With the arrival of Europeans in the 15th century, there was much demand for laces and velvets from the West. Wares from India and China were also highly regarded and more widely traded. The 21st century new rich of Southeast Asia are equally inclined toward foreign goods, although it has to be said that the appeal of Indian and Chinese products is not what it was.

The respect given to imports might partly explain the lack of recognition given to the region’s heritage. When the communities that once commissioned sophisticated works of devotion forget the purpose and overlook the importance of those works, there is little hope that they will ever be fully understood. The Message & The Monsoon attempts to explore this forgotten field of Islamic art and rescue it from the dustbin of ethnography.

Terror's Trivial When It's Not Muslims

An excellent post over at Prison Planet on the lack of a reaction to the ETA bombing of the Madrid airport.

How many people who aren't news junkies know that Madrid Airport was bombed on Saturday? Relatively few I would venture, and that's because major western governments and their media mouthpieces don't hype terror unless Muslims are behind it.

...

Operatives of the Basque separatist organization ETA packed 800kg of explosives in a car bomb that ripped apart the parking lot of Barajas Madrid Airport, killing two and injuring twenty people.

Now imagine if "Al-Qaeda" bombed Heathrow or LAX. You'd never hear the end of it, the news would be on it 24/7 and entering an airport would be akin to checking into a concentration camp. And yet Saturday's blast was greeted by little more than bylines and muted dismissals by the mainstream media.

Before 9/11 terrorism was seen through the prism of a criminal problem because fewer people lose their lives as a result of it than do those who get struck by lightening. There have been just 2,929 terror induced deaths since 9/11 according to the Bush administration's own numbers and more people every year die in swimming pool accidents - hardly the mega threat to western society that many have portrayed. Put in this context, Saturday's bombing would not have made the top of the news because like all terrorism that occurs in the west, it is extremely rare, random and, like murder, rape or theft, is impossible to ever truly prevent.

But in the "post 9/11 world," the artificial creation and maintenance of the myth of "Islamofascism" is dependent on ceaseless obsession with the imminent threat of Muslim terror around every corner, and that's why something like the Madrid Airport bombing would have been shoved down our throats until kingdom come - but only if Muslims were behind it.

Terror attacks like Saturday's become mere pre-cursors to the "and finally" puff piece if they can't be pinned on "Islamofascists" and the scam recycled.

It's almost a national emergency nowadays if Muslims - God forbid - are seen praying on an aeroplane, and their every action being scrutinized as a foreboding for the apocalypse, which only breeds suspicion across all of society, has turned the land of the free into the United States of Hysteria.

Bush Administration Misuses the Word "Caliphate"

I came across NPR's Morning Edition (Wednesday, January 4, 2006) in which historian James Reston, Jr., castigates the Bush Administration for their misuse of the word caliphate. The Bush administration is trying to demonize Muslims by making it sound that we wish to dominate the world (that old lie, normally propagated by Christians fearful of Islam). There's a similar article in the Toronto Star, published in mid-December, that Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld et al are trying to create the idea that a caliphate (if such an institution could be restarted) would become a political threat to the West in general and the United States in particular. (One suspects that Reston had already read Siddiqui's article as there are similar words and phrases used in both; e.g., "claptrap.") What follows is my own transcript of Reston's speech, along with my links to various subjects. More of my comments will follow the transcript.

Announcer: A number of U.S. politicians and generals have quoted a letter reportedly written by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's main operative in Iraq. The letter says that one of Al-Qaeda's main goals after US troops leave Iraq is the establishment of a caliphate in the Middle East. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others have invoked the word caliphate as a warning to the West about terrorist designs. As part of our ongoing series of commentaries on the war in Iraq, historian James Reston, Jr., takes exception.

Reston: Perhaps the only good thing that came out of the events of 9/11 was the higher consciousness that the American people developed about the history of the Arab world and the religion of Islam, but our leaders still have a way to go. The most recent example of denseness comes from Secretary Rumsfeld's frequent misuse of the word caliphate. It is the latest dirty word in the Iraq debate. The Secretary is putting this word out as a warning, saying that Americans must be aware of a terrorist scheme to establish a totalitarian caliphate, stretching all the way from Indonesia, across the Middle East, to Spain. This is nonsense. To be sure, the concept sounds menancing, as it evokes scary images of blood-thirsty Oriental despots in black turbans and silk kaftans. To the Islamic world, however, this will be seen as yet another slur upon Arab history. The caliphates of Medina, Baghdad, Cairo, Istanbul, and Granada, Spain, represent the height of Arab and Islamic achievement. The first four caliphs, as the leaders of the caliphate were called, were the successors of Muhammad. As political leaders they had the support of the vast majority of their subjects. But their religious role, as the defender of the faith, was of equal and supreme importance. It should not be forgotten that the defense of the faith is at the heart of the resistance to the American invasion and occupation of Iraq. To slur the word caliphate is to insult the chief function of the caliph, to defend the lands of Islam against foreign invaders. As we try strenuously to deny that the United States is involved in a clash of civilizations with the Arab world, it is not helpful to insult the glories of Arab history and link them to terrorist pipe dreams of worldwide Islamic domination. It is a palpable absurdity to imagine the killers of Al-Qaeda ruling a true caliphate from Indonesia to Spain. To say so only dignifies and gives weight to terrorist claptrap and makes it harder for the leaders of mainstream Islam to take control of popular sentiment in the Middle East. Like invoking "crusade" or claiming a direct line to a Christian God as justification for the invasion, or engaging in medieval torture or desecrating the holy book of Islam, slurring the caliphates of Arab history is a gift to the terrorists.

Announcer: Commentator James Reston, Jr., is author of Dogs of God: Columbus, The Inquisition, and the Defeat of the Moors.

Personally, I'm not necessarily interested in restoring the Caliphate as it existed in the past (and certainly not as it existed in the last days of the Ottoman Empire). What I would like to see, as a surrogate Caliphate, would be an organization along the lines of both the European Union and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (with the new organization being more of the former than the latter). While I think that an Islamic international agency that works to improve the lives of Muslims worldwide is a worthy and admirable goal, I don't expect, unfortunately, such an organization to appear in my lifetime.


Update: Juan Cole has had a recent post on this topic ("Bush and the Caliphate"), which was in response to Karl Vick's article in the Washington Post, "Reunified Islam: Unlikely but Not Entirely Radical." The WaPo article is decent and worth a read. I would like to reiterate that, while I believe the idea of a revived Caliphate is nice but not a high priority, I do strongly believe that the ummah needs to unite together under some form of leadership for us to be able to resolve our problems. However, as I mentioned earlier, I'd rather see an EU type of organization formed as a substitute Caliphate rather than trying to revive the original model, which has been long dead.